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Tucknott, Darr, MA, May 2006 Sociology
Rocky Mountain Laboratories: An Inquiry into Community Opposition to a Biosafety 
Level IV Expansion
Chairperson: Rebecca T. Richards fdlL-
This study explores the perspectives o f  community members opposed to a federal 
biolaboratory expansion at Rocky Mountain Laboratories in Hamilton, Montana. The 
biolaboratory expansion includes the construction o f Biosafety Level IV laboratories, 
which are facilities equipped to study the most deadly infectious diseases known to man. 
The biolaboratory expansion is funded by federal bioterrorism research monies so that 
potential bioterrorist biological agents may be studied in this expanded facility.
High risk hazardous facilities are defined as those that rely on technology and evoke 
high levels o f dread. Community reactions to high risk hazardous facilities, including 
hazardous waste, nuclear, and mining facilities, have been widely examined. However, 
community response to biolaboratories, potentially another type o f a high risk hazardous 
facility, has yet to be examined. Thus, the purpose o f  this study is to explore the degree 
to which a biolaboratory may be perceived as another type of a high risk hazardous 
facility. This exploratory study examines if  participants’ opposition to a biolaboratory 
reflects previous findings on community response to other types o f  high risk hazardous 
facilities.
In-depth interviews with 10 community members opposed to the biolaboratory 
expansion allowed me to explore their perspectives on this unexamined topic. The data 
collected from these in-depth interviews were analyzed by content analysis that included 
two stages: open coding and axial coding. The results o f this process revealed that 
various themes were found to characterize participants’ opposition to the biolaboratory 
expansion. These multidimensional themes included a negative perception o f the 
expansion approval process, distrust in institutional authority, a negative perception o f 
potential risks, and distrust in the justification for bioterrorism research. Unidimensional 
themes included a negative perception o f  the equity o f expansion and a perceived lack of 
economic benefits from expansion. However, the extent to which each theme influenced 
each participant’s opposition varied.
Participants’ opposition to the biolaboratory expansion was found to reflect other 
community responses to high risk hazardous facilities. Unlike previously determined 
community response to high risk hazardous facilities, participants’ opposition was 
characterized by a strong negative perception o f the public process and questioning o f 
bioterrorism research. Thus, the results o f this exploratory suggest that to some extent 
community residents perceive biolaboratories as a unique type o f a high risk hazardous 
facility.
II
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C H A PTER ON E- IN TRO D U CTIO N
The terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 in the United States prompted 
heightened concern over the safety of the nation. One concern was the possibility that 
infectious diseases could be used as deadly weapons by terrorists. Shortly after this 
pivotal event. President George W. Bush approved a $6 billion federal allocation increase 
for bioterrorism protection (McKee 2002). Of this $6 billion increase, nearly $1.7 billion 
was designated for the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases (NIAID) for 
bioterrorism research since the purpose of the NIAID is to “conduct and support research 
that strives to understand, treat, and ultimately prevent the myriad of infectious, 
immunologic, and allergic diseases that threaten hundreds of millions of people 
worldwide” (NIAID 2004a).
The increased bioterrorism monies will be used by the NIAID to expand research 
in biolaboratories. In these facilities, scientists can study potential terrorist biological 
agents, such as anthrax and Ebola. Across the United States, the NIAID is investing the 
bioterrorism monies in its various intramural and extramural research facilities.
Intramural research is conducted by federal scientists at NIAID laboratories in Bethesda 
and Rockville, MD and Hamilton, MT (NIAID 2004a). The NIAID also supports 
extramural research, which includes research conducted by non-federal employees in 
various universities, medical schools, hospitals, and research institutions (NIAID 2004a).
The NIAID will spend a portion of the bioterrorism research monies in the 
construction and expansion of research facilities. NIAID plans to construct and expand
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
research facilities have sparked concern in several potentially affected communities, 
including Boston, MA, Davis, CA, and Hamilton, MT.
This study examines one potentially affected community, Hamilton, Montana, 
where some residents formed a grassroots opposition against the federal biolaboratory 
expansion. Since 1927, Rocky Mountain Laboratories (RML) in Hamilton, Montana has 
pursued infectious disease research funded by the federal government and funneled 
through its parent agency, the NIAID. The current expansion project at RML, the 
Integrated Research Facility (IRF), will include a Biosafety Level IV research laboratory. 
The IRF is funded by the bioterrorism monies appropriated to the NIAID in 2001. The 
purpose of this study is to describe community opposition during the period of proposed 
expansion from January 2002 through June 2004 to the IRF project at RML.
Biosafety L aboratories
Currently, there are four classifications of research laboratories operated by the 
NIAID from Biosafety Level (BSL) I to IV. According to the NIAID (2004b), “scientists 
use biosafety labs to study contagious materials safely and effectively. These state-of-the 
art labs are designed to not only protect the researcher from contamination, but also to 
prevent microorganisms from entering the environment.” Each BSL classification is 
determined according to “laboratory techniques, safety equipment, and design, depending 
on the types of agents being studied” (NIAID 2004b). With each increasing level, the 
risk to human health from the agents studied in the laboratory increases, with level IV 
being the most hazardous (see Appendix A).
Scientists use the most stringent procedures to protect themselves and the public 
from the deadly diseases studied in a BSL IV laboratory. For example, in a BSL IV
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
laboratory, scientists wear protective suits that filter the air and multiple levels of security 
to protect the lab, including security cameras and card reader identification systems that 
admit only approved personnel (NIAID 2004b). Currently, there are four BSL IV 
laboratories in the United States; these four facilities are located in Atlanta, GA, 
Frederick, MD, San Antonio, XX, and Galveston, XX (NIAID 2004b). RML in 
Hamilton, MX will become the fifth location in the United States with a BSL IV 
laboratory.
Theoretical B ackground
High levels of anxiety, such as community concern over the potential impacts of a 
BSL IV laboratory, may be explained by risk society theory. Risk society theory, as 
suggested by Ulrich Beck (1992), is based on the idea that risk is manufactured and 
managed by society. Risks are not increasingly present, but rather society is organized to 
respond to risk (Irwin 2001). Xhe risk society theory claims that doubt, dread, and 
uncertainty prevail because society has become consumed with managing complex and 
obscure risks.
Xhe emergence of the risk society is an outcome of modern, industrial society’s 
success (Irwin 2001). Xhe focus of industrial society has been the production and 
consumption of goods to overcome scarcity, which is the perceived need or lack of goods 
(Van Loon 2002). In modern industrial society, continuous technological progress is 
needed to create more goods for production and consumption. Institutions of the modem 
society focus on production and consumption; however, latent side effects are 
unaddressed by established institutions (Van Loon 2002).
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The manufactured, latent side effects created by the success o f modem industrial 
society are the “bads” or risks that threaten society and the environment (Van Loon 
2002). Risks are “industrially produced, economically externalized, juridically 
individualized, and scientifically legitimized” (Beck as cited in Irwin 2001:61). Beck (in 
Van Loon 2002) frequently uses nuclear technology to illustrate the latent side effects of 
modern society. Nuclear technology has been used to create electric power; however, the 
nuclear accident at Chernobyl exemplifies how this technology can produce risks that 
harm society and the environment (Van Loon 2002).
As the risks of modern society have become increasingly recognized, institutions 
have attempted to focus on not only the production of goods but also the accompanying 
externalities. The degree of excess “bads” produced by modernity has overwhelmed 
institutions that in turn can only create more risks for society (Van Loon 2002).
Hence, risks are no longer mere side effects of production and consumption; they 
have become the central focus of society. The risk society is thus “an epoch in which the 
dark sides of progress increasingly come to dominate social debate” (Beck in Irwin 
2001:50). Class, inequality, scarcity, and other issues are still important; however, risk 
has become the central focus of institutions. Risks may not affect everyone in society 
equally since new patterns and inequalities of risk exposure continually emerge (Irwin 
2001). According to risk society theory, conflict in society is no longer based on the 
distribution of wealth but on the distribution of risk. A key focus of the risk society is to 
manage the manufactured risks that are frequently invisible, ubiquitous, and deadly. Risk 
society theory seeks to explain why institutions have adopted a heightened concern for 
regulating risk, especially since many risks are not new.
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Risk society theory raises questions about the adequacy of institutions, 
specifically science and technology, to handle risk. These institutions have a dual role 
since they not only generate various risks but they also seek to solve and understand risks 
(Van Loon 2002). As institutions struggle to understand risk by using inadequate tools, 
they may frequently even amplify risk induced problems (Van Loon 2002). Science is 
oriented toward understanding “the definition and distribution of errors and risk which 
are produced by itse lf’ (Irwin 2001:57). Meanwhile, scientific experts are expected to 
reduce risks; although they frequently fail (Irwin 2001). Therefore, individual citizens 
are skeptical of scientific experts and are hence laden with the burden of evaluating risk 
(Van Loon 2002). Thus, managing risks has become a personal and private 
responsibility. Overall, the risk society is characterized by a loss of faith in institutions 
and experts to effectively manage and respond to risks.
The threat of infectious diseases, especially those spread through bioterrorism, 
may thus be understood through the risk society theory. Like risks produced from 
industrialized production, emerging infectious diseases evoke dread and fear. As a latent 
side effect of industrial production, such diseases can be distributed globally by mass 
transportation systems. Infectious diseases are unpredictable, difficult to control, and 
highly lethal. If infectious diseases were to be used by terrorists as weapons, the outcome 
could be disastrous. Concern about bioterrorism has propelled the need for research on 
potential terrorist weapons in biolaboratories. Thus, consistent with the risk society, risk 
has become institutionalized. As bioterrorism research is institutionalized, scientists in 
biolaboratories have begun to examine how to control and cure potential bioterrorist 
weapons. Thus, society can better respond to potential bioterrorism risks.
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However, biolaboratories have a dual role according to the risk society theory.
On one hand, biolaboratories will allow scientists to understand bioterrorism weapons; 
simultaneously, biolaboratories also generate various risks. In a risk society, “the 
technosciense cannot be constrained within laboratories, even if safely sealed off in 
biohazard phase-four labs” (Van Loon 2002:142). Can biolaboratories properly contain 
potential bioterrorism diseases? Can technology and scientific experts manage potential 
bioterrorism diseases? Thus, the risk society theory raises questions about the adequacy 
of biolaboratories to handle risk.
B iolaboratories: A New Species of T rouble?
Erikson (1994) has suggested that society is plagued by a “new species of 
trouble.” According to Erikson (1994), technology designed to protect society from 
“natural disasters” has created a whole new category of “technological disasters” . 
Technological disasters are unique because they are created by humans and thus 
preventable. Erikson (1994) suggests society is increasingly enduring more technological 
disasters that involve radiation and chemical accidents and other toxic emergencies. 
Natural disasters, such as hurricanes or earthquakes, have a distinct beginning and 
ending, whereas technological disasters are endless and without boundaries. Therefore, 
these technological disasters provoke dread and uncertainty. Hence, are biolaboratories 
becoming a “new species of trouble”? The purpose of this study is to explore the degree 
to which a biolaboratory is perceived to be a high risk hazardous facility by some 
community members of Hamilton, Montana.
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C H A PTER  TW O - H ISTO R IC A L BACKGROUND
RML occupies 66 acres o f a residential neighborhood in Hamilton, Montana. The 
purpose of RM L is to conduct research to “understand, treat, and ultimately prevent the 
myriad of infectious, immunologic, and allergic diseases” that threaten society (NIAID 
2004a), Why is a federal biolaboratory located in the remote state of Montana, many 
miles from a large research center or city?
The E arly  Days 1880 th rough  1910
In the late 1880s, a strange, new illness Rocky Mountain spotted fever, which is 
commonly shortened to “spotted fever”, infected early settlers of the Bitterroot Valley in 
western Montana (Harden 1990). The illness was not a widespread problem until the 
1890s; however, the first documented case most likely occurred in 1882 (Harden 1990 
and Philip 2000). Spotted fever was most prevalent from 1900 to 1910, when 141 cases 
were reported in the Bitterroot Valley (see Appendix B). At this time, the illness was not 
recognized as a distinct disease and was frequently given various names including 
measles, black measles, black typhus fever, mountain fever, and fever (Philip 2000). 
Although spotted fever was later discovered to be caused by a rickettsia, a bacteria 
carried by ticks, at the time Ravalli and Missoula County Boards of Health believed that 
it resulted from a parasite in melting snow water (Philip 2000).
The symptoms of spotted fever begin a week or two after the victim has been 
bitten by a tick, and the onset of the symptoms can either occur suddenly or emerge 
slowly (Harden 1990). The first symptom of the disease is a headache followed by pains 
in the back, joints, and legs; the eyes are sensitive to light and often a stiff neck occurs
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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(Harden 1990). Additionally, the patient develops a fever, cannot sleep well, and is very 
restless (Harden 1990). Spotted fever is also characterized by a rash that covers the entire 
body; however, in severe cases victims may die before the rash appears (Harden 1990). 
Victims that have recovered from spotted fever in the Bitterroot Valley usually have been 
sick for approximately two weeks (Harden 1990).
In 1902, Louis B. Wilson and William M. Chowning were the first researchers to 
investigate the disease (Harden 1990). They compiled a comprehensive list of the 
number of cases in the Bitterroot Valley by examining newspapers and requesting records 
from area doctors (Harden 1990). Wilson and Chowning found that at least 88 cases were 
reported between 1895 and 1902 in the valley (Harden 1990). Although the number of 
cases concerned residents, doctors, and public health officials, a more troubling aspect of 
the disease was its high mortality rate of over 70% (Harden 1990). Additionally, Wilson 
and Chowning found that most of the cases of spotted fever occurred between 15 May 
and 15 June and most frequently occurred in healthy males aged 20 to 40 years (Harden 
1990).
Wilson and Chowning also discovered that all of the reported cases of spotted 
fever occurred west of the Bitterroot River. Proximity to the foothills was also a factor; 
as one resident commented, “exposure or residence on the ‘bench’ might for some reason 
be more dangerous than in other near places (of the river) because of the difference in the 
development” (Harden 1990:26). The majority of the spotted fever cases occurred “near 
western fringes of the Bitterroot Valley from Lost Horse Creek in the south to Lolo Creek 
in the North” although cases were also found across western Montana, specifically in 
Missoula and Granite Counties (Philip 2000:59).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Beyond the state of Montana, spotted fever also occurred in other western states 
including Idaho, Oregon, Wyoming, Washington, Utah, Nevada, California, and 
Colorado (Harden 1990). In most cases, the disease was not severe and rarely deadly, so 
that it was never investigated by public health officials. However, the unique severity of 
spotted fever in the Bitterroot Valley motivated the State of Montana Board of Health to 
support fever research by recruiting Wilson and Chowning from Minnesota (Harden 
2000). The future of spotted fever research in western Montana would henceforth 
continue to be dominated by non-local experts. By 1909, Howard Taylor Rickets, a 
young scientist from The University of Chicago, discovered that the infectious agent of 
spotted fever was carried by ticks (Philip 2000). Rickets’ quest to develop a vaccine for 
the disease was hampered by funding delays from the state of Montana; in 1910, Rickets 
died from typhus in Mexico and vaccine development was halted (Philip 2000).
Spotted fever and developm ent 1890 through 1920
The impact of spotted fever on the development of the Bitterroot Valley was 
widespread and lengthy. Once spotted fever was identified as a specific disease of the 
Bitterroot Valley, the future of economic development in the area was of great concern to 
residents and developers. As Harden (1990:22) noted “this dread disease seemed a 
particularly cruel blight on the future development of one of the most beautiful Valleys in 
the western United States.” Efforts were made by local development supporters to ignore 
the disease. For example, in 1904, all subsequent spotted fever deaths were not 
distinguished from other illnesses in local newspaper obituaries (Harden 1990).
From the late 1890s until the 1920s, economic development in the Bitterroot 
Valley was primarily based on logging and apple orchards. Railroad construction
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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between 1887 and 1888 linked the Bitterroot Valley’s abundant timber to outside 
markets, and the resulting logging boom occurred directly after completion of the railroad 
(Philip 2000). During the logging boom, large trees o f value were removed while slash 
remained behind because it was costly, laborious to remove, and lacked market value 
(Philip 2000). By 1899, a total of 500 million board feet was cut from the valley and 
shipped to the Anaconda Copper Mining Company to fuel mining operations in Butte and 
Anaconda, Montana (Philip 2000). In 1890, the Bitterroot Development Company 
(BRDC) was formed and supported by the owner of Anaconda Copper Mining Company, 
Marcus Daly (Philip 2000). To support the vast amount of timber harvested in the 
Bitterroot Valley, the BRDC built a new sawmill in Hamilton in 1890 (Philip 2000).
In the early 1890s, new apple orchards were planted in the cleared lands west of 
the Bitterroot River because land developers claimed the valley provided optimal 
growing conditions for apple trees. Between 1895 and 1896, nearly 50,000 apple trees 
were planted (Philip 2000). The Bitterroot District Irrigation Company provided water 
for agricultural lands by building the “big ditch canal”, a system beginning at the 
constructed Lake Como dam south of Hamilton (Philip 2000:95).
Spotted fever threatened railroad and orchard development in the Bitterroot 
Valley. The Northern Pacific Hospital room in Missoula, Montana was made available 
for Wilson and Chowning (Harden 1990). Harden (1990: 25) noted that “the railroad 
company was eager to assist in the spotted fever investigations, because the expansion of 
its rail lines into Idaho was jeopardized by the disease, as was its supply of lumber for 
ties from the Bitterroot.” Developers from Chicago sold orchards by advertising in 
Chicago newspapers, and their profits were threatened by the disease.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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Spotted fever negative publicity threatened growth in the Bitterroot Valley. In 
1907, land prices in the Bitterroot Valley ranged from $100 to $150 an acre; by 1921, in 
some areas o f the valley, land prices had dropped to $15 an acre (Harden 1990). Real 
estate salesmen from Chicago emphasized that the disease was located only west of the 
river to “minimize the impact of spotted fever on land sales with tangible proof that the 
entire valley was not affected” (Harden 1990:63). Ironically the very emergence of the 
disease could have resulted from the valley’s growth and economic development, since 
cleared land may have provided optimal conditions for the probable increase in small 
animals and ticks.*
By 1913, progress in understanding and controlling spotted fever in rural Montana 
was hindered because of a power struggle between entomologists and physicians. The 
battle between these two professional groups revolved around the unanswered question: 
was spotted fever an insect problem or a human problem? The Montana State Board of 
Entomology was established in 1913 and immediately began disease prevention and 
eradication efforts (Harden 1990). The physicians and entomologists agreed to divide the 
Bitterroot Valley into two sections, one for entomologists and the other physicians 
(Harden 1990). Between 1911 and 1920, the main focus of both groups of professionals 
was tick eradication that was attempted by “dipping” livestock in arsenic baths to remove 
ticks and by killing rodents with poison (Harden 1990). In 1913, local ranchers’ 
resentment of livestock dipping programs was highlighted by the destruction of two 
dipping vats in the Bitterroot Valley (Philip 2000). Tick eradication efforts decreased the
’ The increased occurrence o f  spotted fever coincided with railroad construction, logging, and homestead 
developm ent. Philip (2000:55) suggests that the “developm ent o f  the outbreak and its subsequent decline  
w ere greatly influenced by the events and environmental changes associated with settlement o f  the 
Bitterroot V alley .”
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number of ticks in the Bitterroot Valley; however, the disease remained rampant in the 
mountain canyons (Dr. Huber, pers.comm.^).
R M L 1920 th rough  1940s
In 1921, State Senator Tyler Worden and his wife, Carrie, the President of the 
Montana Federation of W omen’s Clubs, died from spotted fever near Lolo, Montana 
(Kalisch 1973). The loss of this prominent couple caused a huge uproar in Missoula and 
the Bitterroot Valley (Dr. Huber, pers.comm.). Dr. Parker, with the aid of several 
Missoula and Bitterroot Valley organizations, appealed to the Montana Legislature for 
increased spotted fever research funds (Dr. Huber, pers.comm.). As a result, an 
abandoned schoolhouse near Hamilton was obtained by the state for spotted fever 
research.
In 1925, a vaccine for the disease was created by U.S. Public Health physician 
Roscoe R. Spencer and Montana entomologist Ralph R. Parker at the Hamilton facility 
(Harden 1990). The vaccine was made from ground-up ticks infected with spotted fever. 
In 1925, 34 people were inoculated with the vaccine, and they experienced only minor 
side effects (Harden 1990). The following year, 400 people were inoculated; the vaccine 
didn’t protect people from acquiring the disease, but it did decrease disease severity 
(Harden 1990).
Vaccination production in the transformed schoolhouse was very dangerous. 
Moreover, the facility was inadequate for hazardous vaccine production. At the time, the 
laboratory employed 16 staff; during the previous five years, 11 of the workers had 
developed spotted fever or tularemia, another tick borne disease most likely obtained
* All sources w ho were inlerviewed as background informants on the history o f  RML have been 
assigned pseudonym s to insure their anonym ity.
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from laboratory rabbits, guinea pigs, and other small animals used to produce the vaccine 
(Dr. Huber, pers.comm.). Two staff members died from spotted fever, and one died from 
tularemia (Philip 1990).
W ith the support of the Montana State Board of Entomology, in 1927 the 
Montana Legislature appropriated $60,000 for new laboratory construction (Harden 
1990). Once funding became available, the next concern was: where should the 
laboratory be located? Laboratory employees wanted it built at the University of 
Montana since Missoula was larger than Hamilton and Roscoe R. Spencer argued “the 
infected ticks posed no threat to the campus” (Harden 1990; 139). However, the Montana 
State Board of Entomology wanted the facility closer to the Bitterroot Valley. The 
board’s position prevailed when the Hamilton Chamber of Commerce purchased land in 
Hamilton and donated it for the new laboratory (Harden 1990).
Some residents in Hamilton opposed the new laboratory construction. Residents 
of the Pine Grove addition, where the laboratory was eventually built, did not want it in 
their neighborhood. As soon as the announcement was made, “there was an outcry” by 
residents in the Pine Grove neighborhood (Philip 2000:152). Opponents claimed that 
building the laboratory on the east side of the river, where spotted fever did not exist, 
would spread the disease and decrease property values. The April headlines of Western 
News declared opponents “Don’t Want East Side Tick House” (Philip 2000). The 
Bitterroot Irrigation District filed a lawsuit that represented 400 owners of irrigated farm 
land. However, the case was dismissed and the laboratory was constructed (Philip 2000). 
In 1928, the laboratory construction was completed (Philip 2000).
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Although opponents failed to stop laboratory construction, the new building 
emphasized “containment” as recommended by concerned community members (Philip 
1990). Improvements included rounded corners to eliminate tick hiding places and a 
chain-link fence and moat surrounded the property “to prevent escape of ticks and 
trespass by animals and small boys” (Philip 1990:153-4). Vaccine production was 
confined to the third floor, and regulations for entering the facilities were established 
(Philip 1990). After the laboratory construction, additional safety improvements were 
made to fix several problems. For example, ticks escaped from non-sealed windows and 
the air ventilation system spewed ticks out of the laboratory, thus window and ventilation 
replacements were installed (Dr. Huber, pers.comm.). In one incident, laboratory 
monkeys escaped from their cages, existed through an open window, and climbed into 
cedar trees on RML property (Dr. Huber, pers.comm.) Therefore, new monkey-proof 
locks were used to secure the cages.
In 1932, spotted fever appeared in the eastern part of the United States; suddenly, 
vaccine production became a nation-wide concern. As a result, the federal government 
purchased the laboratory from the state of Montana and incorporated it into the Public 
Health Service (Philip 1990). An additional building was completed in 1934, and the 
facility was officially named Rocky Mountain Laboratory (Philip 1990). In 1937, RML 
became part of the National Institutes o f Health (NIH).
Expansion of the facility continued when 26 acres were bought in 1938 to serve as 
a buffer zone between the laboratory and residential neighborhoods (Philip 1990). In 
1939, a third building, a 100-foot smokestack for the oil-heating plant, and two 
residences, for RML scientists Dr. Parker and Dr. Cox, were constructed (Ravalli
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Republic 1939). After the expansions were completed, RML was described as “the best- 
equipped biological laboratory unit in the United States” (Ravalli Republic 1939). It 
included air-conditioning and “every modern factor for science workers” (Ravalli 
Republic 1939). At the time, it was the second largest government owned public health 
facility in the world (Ravalli Republic 1939). Additionally, a fourth building was 
completed the following year (Philip 1990). During this period, RML employed 116 
people who studied various tick and insect bom diseases (Philip 1990). The laboratory, 
with the exception of vaccine production areas, was open to the public and visitors 
frequently toured the facility (Dr. Huber, pers.comm.). Local residents used the RML 
library and children visited their parents there after school (Dr. Huber, pers.comm.).
In 1938, RML scientist Dr. Herald Cox discovered that spotted fever could be 
grown in yolk sacs of embryonic chicken eggs; thus, the dangerous method of vaccine 
production from ground-up infested ticks was discontinued (Philip 1990). During World 
W ar II, RML produced yellow fever, typhus, and spotted fever vaccines for the U.S. 
military forces (Dr. Huber, pers.comm.). In 1949, RML director Dr. Parker died at a time 
when spotted fever was diminishing across the country. As the “Parker era” of spotted 
fever research was ending, the future of RML was unclear (Dr. Huber, pers.comm.).
R M L 1950s through 1980
In the 1950s, RML experienced massive changes. The NIH had established 
another research center with a practical research focus; therefore, the NIH needed RML 
to shift from practical to basic research (Dr. Huber, pers.comm.). In 1955, the NIH 
established a branch called the National Microbiological Institute which subsequently 
was renamed the National Institution of Allergy and Infectious Diseases (NIAID), and
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RML became its largest field laboratory that was mandated to study infectious and 
tropical diseases (Philip 1990). The new director, Carl Larson, brought new people to 
RML and expanded the laboratory’s research agenda (Dr. Huber, pers.comm.; Dr. 
Morgan, pers.comm.). Although the laboratory continued to focus on diseases contracted 
from ticks, general confusion about the direction of RML prevailed (Dr. Huber, 
pers.comm.; Dr. Morgan, pers.comm.). New, basic scientists from fields such as 
microbiology and molecular biology began studying tuberculosis, whooping cough, 
rabies, and other related diseases (Dr. Huber, pers.comm.; Dr. Morgan, pers.comm.). 
Overall, the research direction at RML changed from one that was field oriented to one 
that was grounded in the basic scientific research of infectious diseases (Philip 1990).
Research at RML continued to expand during the 1960s without major 
improvements to laboratory equipment and other resources (Dr. Morgan, pers.comm.). 
Scientists were allowed to work in many different disciplines, but research was often 
conducted in very “primitive conditions’’ (Dr. Morgan, pers.comm.). Public access was 
still available in designated areas; for example, local high school students used the library 
for schoolwork (Dr. Morgan, pers.comm.). Safety remained a concern at the laboratory. 
One former scientist described how laboratory infections were common and almost 
“everyone eventually got Q fever’’ (Dr. Morgan, pers.comm.).^ Local laundry workers, 
who were employed outside of the laboratory, became sick with Q fever from 
contaminated laundry (Dr. Huber, pers.comm.). Safety precautions at the laboratory 
continuously evolved and improved, in part guided by lessons learned from these events.
 ̂The respiratory disease, Rickettsia burneti, com m only called Q fever, is transmitted from infected 
laboratory animals. It is highly infectious and causes flu-like sym ptom s (Philip 2000). Although RML 
em ployees received a vaccine as protection against the d isease, many still contracted Q fever (Dr. Huber, 
pers.com m .).
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In the 1970s, RML experienced major changes in research programs and staff. 
During this time, “out moded methods of research at the lab were done away with and the 
scientific staff underwent a major turnover” (Wiens 1982). The administration was 
“reinvented”, as efforts were made to bring the laboratory “into the cutting edge” of 
science (Dr. Morgan, pers.comm.). At this time, tick research at RML was minimized. 
(Dr. Morgan, pers.comm.). RML was expanded and upgraded; workers were formed into 
three separate research departments (Dr. Morgan, pers.comm.). A group of scientific 
counselors made annual visits to review and determine how research should progress at 
the laboratory (Dr. Huber, pers.comm.; Dr. Morgan, pers.comm.). Nearly half of the staff 
changed at RML, some through retirements, and through the hiring of “new, younger 
scientists” (Wiens 1982). The new trend at the laboratory was to have a few tenured 
scientists and many short-term, post-doc tori al researchers (Dr. Morgan, pers.comm.). As 
a result, new people arrived to work at RML for shorter periods of time and were less 
involved with the local community (Dr. Morgan, pers.comm.).
RM L 1980 through early 2000
In 1982, federal laboratory officials declared that the future of RML was 
optimistic, “despite rumors to the contrary” (Wiens 1982). At the time, the laboratory 
was facing major funding cutbacks, but federal officials “refuted fears that the lab in 
Hamilton would eventually be phased out of operation” (Wiens 1982). However, one 
year later, a laboratory closure proposal threatened the future of RML (Towslee 1983a). 
The Grace Commission, which evaluated government spending, recommended the 
closure of RML and the transfer of its research activities to the NIH headquarters in 
Bethesda, Maryland (Towslee 1983a). According to the Grace Commission, the closure
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of RML with its 130 employees would save the federal government $14.1 million over 
three years (Towslee 2005b). The commission cited other reasons for closing RML 
including the laboratory’s isolated location, its trouble attracting scientists, high travel 
expenses, a lack of nearby facilities, its redundant research, and a lack of educational 
opportunities for scientists (Towslee 1983a).
The potential shutdown of RML was opposed by the Montana congressional 
representation, local government officials, scientists, and local citizens (Dr. Johnson, 
pers. comm.). Defenders of RML emphasized its research accomplishments, its 
beneficial employment for the community, and the potential costs of relocating the 
laboratory (Towslee 1983a and Wiens 1983). As a result, the Grace Commission 
withdrew its closure recommendations (Dr. Johnson, pers. comm.).
Suddenly, RML not only survived potential closure, but funding was available for 
expansions and upgrades (Towslee 1983b). During this time, new laboratory branches 
were formed; consequently, the Rocky Mountain Laboratory was officially renamed 
Rocky Mountain Laboratories to represent the various research foci; however, the 
acronym RML remained (Dr. Johnson, pers. comm.). RML’s historical tick and vector 
borne research was de-emphasized and the worlds’ largest collection of tick was 
transferred from RML to the Smithsonian Institution in Washington, D C. (Dr. Johnson, 
pers. comm.). The 1980s was also a period of drastic safety improvements at the facility 
because general scientific knowledge of experiment safety had led to codifying safety 
equipment, procedures, and laboratories (Dr. Johnson, pers. comm.). For example, the 
implementation of federal codification of biosafety levels regulated laboratory 
experiments (Dr. Johnson, pers. comm.). Additionally, biological safety cabinets, which
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are steel compartments with filtered air that contain experiment agents, were built at 
RM L (Dr. Johnson, pers. comm.).
In the mid-1990s, some of the RML buildings did not meet federal safety codes; 
therefore, several buildings were remodeled and another new building was constructed 
(Dr. Johnson, pers. comm.). The laboratory already operated at BSL I and II, but 
additional BSL III laboratories were built in the late 1990s (Dr. Johnson, pers. comm.).
In 1995, the bombing of a federal building in Oklahoma City impacted safety practices at 
RML. As a federal facility, RML safety measures were evaluated, and the subsequent 
events of September 11, 2001 provided funding for increased security measures (Dr. 
Johnson, pers. comm.). Consequently, shortly after the terrorists’ attacks, a fence was 
constructed around the RML facility (Dr. Johnson, pers. comm.). Security was also 
increased at the laboratory, with security personnel guarding the laboratory entrance and 
restricting public access (Dr. Johnson, pers. comm.).
Integrated Research Facility Expansion
Research, organization, and safety practices have evolved at RML over the past 
80 years. Currently, the NIH consists of 27 institutes and centers, including the NIAID 
(Dr. Johnson, pers. comm.). The NIAID intramural research branch includes federal 
scientists at RML, Bethesda and Rockville, Maryland, and small units abroad (Dr. 
Johnson, pers. comm.). RML is organized into five departments including the laboratory 
of human bacteria pathogenesis, intracellular parasites, persistent viral diseases, 
veterinarian branch, and administration/ facility management (Pekoe 2004; 11).
In 2002, construction of the Integrated Research Facility (IRF) was proposed. As 
proposed, it included BSL IV research facilities and the $66.7 million construction of a
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100,000 square foot building (NIAID 2004b). During the past 80 years, RML has existed 
in Hamilton without any community-wide conflict, except for initial opposition to the 
laboratory construction in 1927 (Dr. Huber, pers. comm.; Dr. Johnson, pers.comm.; Dr. 
Morgan, pers. comm.). However, the IRF sparked opposition, and many citizens have 
voiced concerns against the BSL IV laboratory.
According to the NIAID, the construction of the IRF is needed to accomplish 
RM L’s expanded mission. The NIAID’s mission has been expanded to “include basic 
and applied research aimed at addressing specific issues outlined in the national bio­
defense response plans” (NIAID 2004c). The NIAID has received an additional $1.7 
billion congressional allocation, the largest budget increase in the institution’s history to 
study “agents of bioterrorism” and make the “country better prepared” to reduce the 
impact of potential bioterrorist attacks (NIAID 2004c). Additionally, the expanded 
facilities are expected to “help develop new diagnostics, vaccines, and treatments for 
diseases caused by emerging infections and the intentional release of an infectious agent 
into a civilian population” (NIAID 2004c).
As proposed, the IRF would make RML the fifth operational BSL IV laboratory 
in the United States. Other BSL IV facilities are currently located at the Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention in Atlanta GA, the United States Army Medical 
Research Institute for Infectious Diseases at Fort Detrick in Frederick MD, the 
Southwest Foundation for Biomedical Research in San Antonio TX, and the University 
of Texas at Galveston TX (NIAID, 2004b). The cities currently hosting BSL IV 
laboratories have populations ranging from 52,247 to over one million (see Table 1). 
These four operational BSL IV laboratories are located in metropolitan counties; Ravalli
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County would become the first nonmetropolitan location for a BSL IV laboratory in the
United States. The population density in the counties where BSL IV laboratories are
currently located is between 912 and 2,964 persons per square mile. In comparison,
Ravalli County has a population density of only 18 persons per square mile.
Table 1. Population o f BSL IV host cities and counties in the U.S. (Source: U S. 
Census 2000).
BSL IV location Host City Host City 
Population
Host County Host County 
Population 
per square mi
Centers for Disease 
Control & 
Prevention
Atlanta,
GA
416,474 DeKalb Co. 2,519
Rocky Mountain 
Laboratory
Hamilton,
MT
3,705 Ravalli Co. 18
Southwest 
Foundation for 
Biomedical 
Research
San
Antonio,
TX
1,144,646 Bexar Co. 1,011
University of Texas Galveston,
TX
52,247 Galveston Co. 627
U.S. Army Medical 
Research Institute 
for Infectious 
Diseases
Frederick,
MD
52,767 Frederick Co. 912
Construction of the IRF at RML would include laboratories, offices, conference 
rooms, a lunch room, animal quarters, mechanical space, and a waste handling area 
(NIAID 2004c). Several laboratories that would operate at the BSL IV level would 
encompass 6,800 square feet of the entire 100,000 square foot facility. The BSL IV 
laboratories would be surrounded by a corridor, which would provide a “buffer between 
the lab and exterior” (NIAID 2004c). The two year construction project would include 
nearly 200 workers during peak construction (NIAID 2004b). Payroll from the two year
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construction project is expected to reach $4.7 million that would produce a total of $18.9 
million in local economic activity (NIAID 2004b).
RML would also hire new employees to work in the expanded IRF. These jobs 
would encourage more economic activity in the rapidly growing valley. During 1990 to 
2000, Ravalli County experienced a 44.2% increase in population, the largest county- 
wide population growth rate in Montana for the decade (U.S. Census 2000). Currently 
255 people, 77 of whom have doctoral degrees, are employed at RML with an average 
salary of $41,600 (FitzSimmons 2004). Meanwhile, the average per capita income in 
Montana is significantly less at $17,151 (U.S. Census 2000). Once the IRF opens, an 
expected 100 new employees would work at RML and bring an additional 245 residents 
to the Hamilton area (FitzSimmons 2004). An influx of new residents could increase 
business and real estate earnings for the surrounding area. The payroll for the new 
employees might amount to $6.6 million annual additional earnings to the current $10.4 
million payroll (FitzSimmons 2004). For every 100 RML jobs, an estimated 40 jobs 
would be created in Montana and for every $1 million in RML salaries, $600,000 in the 
state-wide economy would be generated (Pekoe 2004).
Furthermore, RML is a key contributor to the biotechnology industry that is an 
important sector in the Montana economy. Concentrations of biotechnology facilities in 
the state are about twice the national average (FitzSimmons 2004). In Montana, 110 
biotechnology businesses were operating in 2004, and the industry experienced a 22% 
growth rate from 1990 to 2000 (FitzSimmons 2004). The number of people employed 
by the biotechnology industry could double in the next five to 10 years (FitzSimmons 
2004).
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IRF approval process
Once the IRF at RML was publicly announced in January 2002, community 
opposition formed. The IRF approval process began in January, 2002 when the proposed 
expansion facility was announced. A detailed timeline of the major events occurring 
during the approval process is described in Table 2.
Table 2. IRF approval process timetable (Source: Compiled from newspaper 
articles, opposition group websites, and meeting video recordings)._________________
Date Event
January, 2002 
February, 2002 
Summer, 2002 
September, 2002 
October, 2002 
January, 2003 
April, 2003 
May, 2003 
June, 2003
July, 2003 
September, 2003 
December, 2003
April, 2004
June, 2004 
August, 2004
September, 2004
IRF proposal announced
RML public meeting about proposal
New opposition group formed
Environmental Assessment released
First RML Community Liaison Group meeting
RML Town hall meeting
RML open house
Draft Environmental Impact Statement released
Opposition groups’ public meeting
RML public comment meeting
RML public comment meeting
RML public comment meeting
RML Town hall meeting
Supplementary Draft Environmental Impact Statement released
Final Environmental Impact Statement released
One opposition group filed lawsuit against NIH for Freedom of
Information Act violation
RML Record of Decision released
Opposition groups’ lawsuit filed against NIH to stop lab
construction
Settlement reached
Approximately a month after the announcement, RML hosted a public meeting 
about the proposal. The following summer, concerned citizens opposed to the laboratory 
expansion formed a new non-profit organization that collaborated with two previously
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established organizations'^. In September 2002, an environmental assessment was 
released to the public by the NIAID, and the following month the first monthly meeting 
for the RML Community Liaison Group (CLG) was held. This group of 25 community 
members was formed by RML to “promote collaboration and cooperation between RML 
and the community” (RML CLG meeting notes 2002). CLG members were charged with 
communicating concerns from the community to RML and to NIAID, and to disseminate 
information from the laboratory to the community.
RML hosted a town hall meeting and open house in early 2003 to disseminate 
information about the laboratory expansion. After receiving public comments, the 
NIAID announced that the environmental assessment was not adequate and therefore an 
Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) had to be conducted. The EIS generated over 100 
public comments from the community (Farrell 2003).
After public comments were submitted for the first EIS, a second EIS draft was 
released in December 2003. Again citizens had another opportunity to voice concerns. 
RML hosted several public meetings and opposition groups also sponsored at least one 
public meeting. In December 2003, a supplementary EIS was released. After a shorter 
comment period, the NIH released the final EIS in April 2004. One opposition group 
filed a lawsuit in which they claimed that the NIH had violated the Freedom of 
Information Act by withholding requested internal documents; the opposition group won 
the lawsuit and therefore the documents were released.
Despite community opposition efforts, the NIH officially approved the laboratory 
IRF in June 2004. The agency had determined that the IRF expansion would provide the
 ̂ The names o f  the three opposition groups involved with the IRF expansion arc not identified to insure 
confidentiality o f  these organizations and their members.
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most benefit from public funding and noted that RML is “historically strong in vector* 
borne expertise, which is unmatched at any other site” (NIAID 2004c). Additionally, the 
NIH concluded that the IRF expansion would have no negative effects or increased risks 
to the environment, citizens, and community. The NIH’s position supports its claim with 
the fact that there has never been a community release of biological agents from any BSL 
rV facility (Farrell 2003).
After the IRF was approved, opposition groups filed a joint lawsuit against the 
NIH to stop the IRF construction. The judge denied the plaintiffs a trial and ordered 
mediation, which resulted in a settlement agreement. Compromises from the mediation 
included the agreements that RML would submit a list of research pathogens to Ravalli 
County doctors, that pathogens would not be used as biological weapons, and that all 
safety related incidents would be reported to safety officers inside and outside of 
laboratory (McKee 2004). Additionally, a backup isolation room outside the BSL IV at 
RML would be built 75 miles away to be used if an accident or pathogen release 
occurred. Finally, the laboratory would discontinue incinerating non-medical waste by 
the fall of 2005 (McKee 2004).
Summary
The unique severity of spotted fever in the Bitterroot Valley is why RML was 
established in the rural state of Montana. Since RML began as a research facility for 
spotted fever, it has become a highly technological facility equipped to study deadly 
infectious diseases (see Table 3). Additionally, the organization and safety features at 
RML have continually changed. The expanded organization at RML, including an 
increased numbers of employees, buildings, and research foci, has created a large, formal
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bureaucracy. Furthermore, it is a bureaucracy primarily managed by non-local federal 
employees. In addition, the institution is now charged with the new responsibility of 
managing bioterrorism research. Thus, the IRF expansion will become another layer of 
RM L’s bureaucracy.
Table 3: RML historical events (Source: compiled from newspaper articles, books, 
and personal communication)___________________________________________________
Date(s) Event(s)________________________________________________________________
1880s Spotted fever emerges as a widespread problem in the Bitterroot Valley
1902 Spotted fever research begins in the Bitterroot Valley
1921 Old schoolhouse near Hamilton established as a spotted fever research facility
1925 Spotted fever vaccine created; 16 staff employed at the research facility
1927 Construction of a new laboratory facility in Hamilton
1932 Federal government purchases laboratory from the state of Montana; laboratory
apart of the Public Health Service 
1934 New laboratory building constructed; laboratory officially named Rocky
Mountain Laboratory
1937 RML becomes apart of the National Institutes of Health (NIH)
1938 3'̂ '* building and 2 houses constructed
1940 4'"' building constructed; 116 employees at RML
1955 NIH creates a new branch, the National Institutes of Allergy and Infectious
Diseases (NIAID) that subsequently includes RML 
1970s RML facility upgrades and 3 new research departments created
1983 RML closure threat by the Grace Commission
1983- Rocky Mountain Lxiboratory name changed to Rocky Mountain Laboratories',
1989 biosafety laboratories codified
1990s BSL III laboratories installed
2001 Security increased and RML closed to the public; 255 employees at RML
2002 Integrated Research Facility (IRF) proposed
2004 IRF approved___________________________________________________________
Improved safety measures at RML have created a research facility that is 
currently more dependent on technology; however, it has become safer for infectious 
disease research (Dr. Huber, pers. comm.; Dr. Johnson, pers. comm.; and Dr. Morgan, 
pers.comm.). For example, deadly accidents have not occurred since the era of spotted 
fever research during the early 1900s. The recent safety measure to restrict public access 
has reduced the potential risks of outsider intervention at RML. However, restricted
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public access has also decreased its transparency, so that safety measures within RML 
remain unknown to the public.
RM L has presented several problems for Hamilton, including its initial 
construction, potential closures, and accidents. Community-wide opposition to plans at 
RML has occurred twice, including opposition to the initial construction of the facility. 
More recently, the IRF expansion project has sparked a grassroots opposition and such 
rural opposition to biolaboratories has not yet been studied. The next chapter will review 
the literature to provide a background of key factors influencing community opposition to 
high risk hazardous facilities.
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CHAPTER THREE- LITERATURE REVIEW
Community response to the siting of high risk hazardous facilities, including 
nuclear power plants, nuclear incinerators, toxic waste landfills, and mining operations 
have been widely examined in the sociological literature. Studies most frequently 
examine community response to hazardous waste landfills because a high level of public 
dread is associated with such facilities. Also, most studies of high risk hazardous 
facilities in rural communities have focused on hazardous waste because of the high 
proportion of proposed sitings or successful sitings of hazardous waste facilities in rural 
areas. These facilities have been sited, or proposed for siting, primarily in rural areas 
where population density is low and large expanses of open land are available at 
relatively low prices. Additionally, rural communities that encourage local growth 
promotion as a solution to economic decline are frequent candidates for a hazardous 
waste facility siting (Bohon and Humphrey 2000). Consequently, rural areas have 
increasingly become a repository for the undesirable waste industries created by society 
(Fitchen 1991).
The findings from high risk hazardous waste studies have been used to inform 
other high risk technological projects, including gold cyanide mining (Richards and Brod 
2004) and limestone mining (Eser and Luloff 2003; Steeman and Carmin 1998).
Although mining projects may not be as dreaded as hazardous waste, they are still 
perceived to be high risk endeavors.
High risk hazardous facilities have been defined as projects that rely on 
technology and involve uncertain risks. Frequently, new technology is used in high risk
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hazardous facilities to contain waste, extract minerals, and create energy. Uncertain risks 
associated with high risk hazardous facilities include potential technological failures 
which could threaten public health and the environment. Thus, high risk hazardous 
facilities evoke dread. Community support and opposition to high risk hazardous 
facilities have been analyzed by examining the perceptions of individuals. Resident 
perceptions in high risk hazardous facility operating and siting communities have been 
compared to resident attitudes in baseline, non-high risk hazardous facility locales.
Biolaboratories may be perceived by community residents as another type of a 
high risk hazardous facility. Biological agents found in biolaboratories, particularly those 
that may be used for bioterrorism and are untreatable, are most likely to be perceived as 
dreadful as hazardous waste. Like high risk hazardous facilities, biolaboratories rely on 
new technology to contain infectious diseases and involve uncertain risks if the agents 
were to be released. However, biolaboratories as another perceived type of a high risk 
hazardous facility have not yet been investigated.
Costs and Benefits of High Risk Hazardous Facilities
Residents facing the proposed siting of a high risk hazardous facility in their 
community have to evaluate the possible benefits and costs associated with these new 
institutions. Frequently, residents’ beliefs that the potential costs outweigh the benefits 
spark community opposition. Thus, many siting attempts have failed because of strong 
local resistance. Community opposition to “locally unwanted land uses” or LULUs is 
frequently labeled as the “not in my backyard” or NIMBY syndrome. The NIMBY 
syndrome suggests that while community members acknowledge the need for high risk 
hazardous facilities, they do not want such institutions located near their particular
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community (Fitchen 1991; Portney 1991). However, the NIMBY label does not 
differentiate the various types o f opponents because some people may oppose the siting 
of these facilities in anyone’s backyard and not just their own (Luloff, Albrecht, and 
Bourke 1998). Although the NIMBY label is frequently used to describe opposition to 
LULUs, other complex and interconnected factors may determine residents’ attitudes.
Opposition to siting high risk hazardous facilities has been a major topic of rural 
sociological research in the last 20 years (Benford, Moore and Williams 1993; Bohon and 
Humphrey 2000; Erickson 1994; Jenkins-Smith and Kunreuther 2001; Hamilton 1985; 
Krannich and Albrecht 1995; Sjoberg 2004; Slovic et al. 1991; Spies et al. 1998). The 
key factors that increase community opposition to a high risk hazardous facility have 
been identified as distrust of facility management, high risk perception, perceived lack of 
economic benefits, potential stigma, previous negative siting experience, and perceived 
inequalities. These factors are frequently interrelated so that opposition is 
multidimensional and complex. Therefore, community opposition to the siting of high 
risk hazardous facilities, including biolaboratories, is expected to be influenced by any 
one or more of these factors.
Distrust
A key factor influencing opposition to the siting of a high risk hazardous facility 
is distrust in the responsible agencies and organizations managing the sites (Albrecht, 
Amey and Amir 1996; Couch and Kroll-Smith 1994; Flynn et al. 1992; Jenkins-Smith 
and Kunreuther 2001; Sjoberg 2004; Wakefield and Elliot 2000). Opposition is 
magnified when community members do not trust the people or institutions responsible 
for the proposed facility. As trust in facility management decreases, resident opposition
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to these facilities increases (Albrecht et al. 1996; Couch and Kroll-Smith 1994; Flynn et 
al. 1992; Jenkins-Smith and Kunreuther 2001; Sjoberg 2004; Wakefield and Elliot 2000).
A related explanation for opposition to high risk hazardous facilities is recreancy, 
a multidimensional factor of both trust and risk perception (Freudenberg 2001). 
Freudenberg (2001: 87) originally defined recreancy as “the failure of institutional actors 
to carry out their responsibilities with the degree of rigor necessary to merit the social 
trust they enjoy.” Recreancy has been generally viewed as the extent to which people 
trust institutions and experts responsible for safely managing high risk hazardous 
facilities (Murdock et a. 1999).
When people lack the knowledge required to assess the risks and benefits 
associated with a technology, they have to depend on experts to provide that information. 
Thus, when individuals lack knowledge of a hazard or technology, trust in those 
managing the facilities influences risk perception. Social trust in experts has been found 
to be an important factor influencing risk perception when knowledge is lacking (Siegrist 
and Cvetknivich 2000). As a result, residents with low levels of recreancy in nuclear 
waste managements exhibit more opposition to those facilities (Freudenberg 2001). 
Similarly, residents with lower levels of recreancy have shown higher levels of 
opposition to high risk hazardous waste facilities (Murdoch et al.l999).
Risk Perception
Opposed community members may question the ability of a facility’s 
management to protect the community from various perceived health and safety hazards 
associated with the facilities during the construction and operation of these sites. Such 
opposition to a high risk hazardous facility has been found to be influenced by the
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perceptions of technological risk (Flynn et al. 1992). Perceived technological risk is thus 
associated with the potential negative consequences that may result from the technologies 
used to operate facilities. When a technology is risky, people anticipate few benefits 
from its implementation (Siegrist and Cvetkovich 2000). Risk perception studies have 
found that people perceive hazardous wastes, especially nuclear waste, as unknown, 
uncontrollable, and dreadful (Slovic 1987). Additionally, another dimension of risk 
perception is the idea of “tampering with nature”, or interfering with natural processes 
(Sjoberg 2000). As community members’ risk perception in a proposed facility 
increases, the likelihood that they will oppose the facility also increases (Bourke 1994; 
Flynn et al. 1992; Jenkins-Smith and Kunreuther 2001; Krannich and Albrecht 1995;
Spies et al. 1998).
Risk perception is closely associated with potential public health, safety risks, and 
environmental contamination. Community opposition results when residents fear that the 
community’s health and safety are threatened if a facility’s technology fails (Bassett, 
Jenkins-Smith and Silva 1996). General environmental contamination and specific 
environmental impacts on wildlife, groundwater, rivers, and other water sources have 
also been found to be major technological risk concerns of those opposed to siting 
facilities (Albrecht el al. 1996; Baxter, Eyles and Elliott 1999; Krannich & Albrecht 
1995). Additionally, residents may fear that environmental contamination could cause an 
area to become an unsuitable location for people to live (Bassett el al, 1996). Resistance 
is magnified when opposed residents perceive high levels of risk associated with both 
health and safety issues and environmental contamination (Murdoch et al. 1999).
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Numerous studies have tried to explain why people perceive risk differently. One 
explanation is that risk perception is impacted by the knowledge level that each 
individual has of the technological application at any given high risk hazardous facility; 
however, there are disagreements as to whether less knowledge actually increases risk 
perception. Some studies have found that those with greater knowledge of the 
technology utilized in or proposed for facilities perceive less risk (Bassett el al. 1996), 
while other studies have noted that those with less knowledge perceive more risk (Flynn 
et al. 1992). Still studies have found that less knowledge does not equate to more 
opposition; in fact, those most strongly opposed to a high risk hazardous waste facility 
have the greatest level of knowledge of waste management issues (Murdock et al. 1999).
Perception of risk appears to be socially constructed differently by experts and 
laypeople who “speak in different languages” (Gerrard 1994). Experts and laypeople 
appear to have different “conceptual frameworks” when defining and evaluating risks 
(Flynn, Slovic, and Mertz 1993). Experts can be defined as those people with 
professional involvement with risk assessment who perceive risks based on quantitative, 
technical, and factual information (Fischhoff, Slovic and Lichtenstein 1985). Experts are 
more positive about high risk hazardous technologies and have fewer concerns (Flynn et 
al. 1993); additionally, they believe little is unknown about technological risk (Sjoberg 
2001). In contrast, laypeople can be considered those people who assess risks that are 
more likely to be unanswered by science, especially those risks that are unfamiliar, 
dreaded, unobservable, or have delayed effects (Fischhoff et al. 1985). Laypeople are 
skeptical about expert knowledge and view unknown risk as very negative (Sjoberg 
2001).
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W hile experts evaluate risks based on scientific information, laypersons perceive 
risks as questions that science has not answered. This discrepancy in identifying risk 
often fuels community opposition to a high risk hazardous facility. Residents may view 
experts as not only untrustworthy but also as patronizing and too technical (Baxter et al.
1999). Expert communication at public meetings may negatively impact residents’ 
perceptions o f risk (McComas 2003). Residents may also believe there are limits to the 
experts’ knowledge so that guarantees of negligible risks can not be legitimately made by 
the experts (Baxter et al. 1999). Although most evidence suggests that experts judge risk 
differently than laypeople, others conclude that little empirical evidence exists to support 
this claim since risk perception is confounded by other social and demographic factors 
(Row and Wright 2001).
Lack of Perceived Economic Benefits
A key factor influencing opposition to the siting of high risk hazardous facilities 
is the perception that the facility will not provide economic benefits to individuals and the 
community. As many rural communities struggle economically, high risk hazardous 
facilities offer a source of potential economic growth that could create local employment. 
Additionally, economic incentives and mitigations offered by the facility’s management 
could increase public funds for infrastructure and services such as roads, schools, water 
or sewer systems, and police and fire protection. Overall, opponents to a facility have 
negative views of the benefits offered by facility management (Jenkins-Smith and 
Kunreuther 2001).
Opposition to a facility is increased if residents perceive that few economic 
benefits will result from the new facilities (Bourke 1994; Krannich and Albrecht 1995;
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Murdock et al. 1999; Spies et al. 1998). Additionally, communities with a stronger local 
economy perceive fewer economic benefits and have been found to exhibit more 
opposition than those with weaker local economies (Bourke 1994). Greater levels of 
opposition have also been documented in towns further away from proposed facilities 
since residents perceive fewer economic benefits as facility distance increases (Benford 
et al. 1993).
Stigma
Community stigma may also become associated with siting a high risk hazardous 
facility and such stigma has been found to impact resident opposition. Stigma can affect 
the “collective morale” or social well-being of a community (Gregory and Satterfield 
2002; Wulfhorst 2000; Wulfhorst and Krannich 1999). Additionally, stigma can cause 
many psychological and cultural impacts for contaminated community members 
(Gregory and Satterfield 2002).
Residents may be concerned that hosting a high risk hazardous facility will result 
in the community being labeled as “contaminated” and that permanent stigmatization will 
result (Wulfhorst 2000). Because outsiders may perceive the community as 
contaminated, the community’s reputation will be destroyed. Stigma can therefore have 
negative economic effects on a locale. Opposed residents believe that stigma will have a 
negative impact on industries located in the community; in particular, concern for a 
decline in tourism has been noted (Albrecht et al. 1996; Flynn et. al 1992; Slovic et. al 
1991).
Additionally, opposed residents may believe that a high risk hazardous facility 
will threaten the quality of life of their rural community and that the core community
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values of a quiet, small-town community will be lost (Baxter et. al 1999; Couch and 
Kroll-Smith 1994; Fitchen 1991; Krannich and Albrecht 1995; Wakefield and Elliott 
2000). In particular, opposed residents may believe that their community will be spoiled 
by such a facility and that the impacts are not consistent with rural images of an open, 
clean countryside (Baxter et al. 1999; Fitchen 1991). While stigma is most frequently 
associated with negative consequences, residents of high growth communities may 
believe stigma will suppress population growth, which may be a positive outcome for 
those resistant to population growth (Wulfhorst 2000).
Siting Experience
Opposition is also influenced by whether a community currently hosts a high risk 
hazardous facility. When a high risk hazardous facility is a new institution in a 
community, the new host residents’ opinions differ from residents in communities 
already hosting such facilities. Residents are more likely to be opposed to the siting of a 
new facility if their community is not a current host. Communities with high risk 
industries are already familiar with the facilities and technology; additionally, local 
community members may work at the facility. In contrast, in potential host communities 
such facilities may be a new, unknown threat (Albrecht et. al 1996; Krannich and 
Albrecht 1995; Sjoberg 2004).
Community opposition is also influenced by the siting process as residents 
balance the costs and benefits associated with their community hosting a high risk 
hazardous facility. Residents in baseline, nonwaste facility communities are more likely 
to be opposed than residents of waste operating and waste siting communities (Murdock 
et al. 1999). Although opposition may still be high, residents of communities with an
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
37
operating or soon to be sited facility become less opposed overall to high risk hazardous 
facilities when compared to baseline, nonwaste facility communities; additionally, 
residents perceive lower risk levels created by these facilities (Benford et al. 1993; 
Murdock et al. 1999).
Equity
Perception of equity in distributing the potential impacts of a high risk hazardous 
facility is a key factor influencing resident opposition to such facilities. Equity issues 
often involve questions of intrusion since unwanted wastes and technologies are imported 
into communities. Public opposition is greater when the hazards are created elsewhere 
and imported into a community (Gerrard 1994).
While society has created the need for these facilities, rural residents are required 
to take more hazardous waste than urban residents as communities that host high risk 
hazardous waste facilities are predominantly rural (Murdock et al. 1999). Rural residents 
become sensitive to the costs and benefits that their community will face by hosting these 
sites. Frequently, site managers offer economic incentives and safety measures to the 
community to mitigate the costs and risks associated with hosting high risk hazardous 
facilities. If the economic benefits and safety measures offered by facility management 
are perceived as unfair, opposition is increased (Jenkins-Smith and Kunreuther 2001). 
Opposed community members may feel that the process offers little opportunity for 
meaningful participation (Wakefield and Elliott 2000). Additionally, if the siting process 
is perceived as unfair, opposition is often magnified (Murdoch et al. 1999; Spies et al. 
1998).
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The environmental justice movement has focused attention on the fact that ethnic, 
people o f color, and poor communities are disproportionately exposed to environmental 
risks (Bullard 1993). As the number of colored people increases in a community, the 
probability o f high risk hazardous facilities being located there increases (Lee 1993). 
Socio-economic status also impacts the location of hazardous wastes, as poor 
communities are more likely to be targeted as hosts (Lee 1993). Residents in 
communities with lower socioeconomic status are more likely to oppose a high risk 
hazardous facility, despite the potential economic opportunity (Buhon and Humphrey
2000). However, race is still the most significant predictor of where hazardous waste 
facilities are located (Lee 1993). Frequently a combination of equity factors influences 
community opposition; for example, opposed residents may feel that their community is 
being targeted because it is a poor, rural, ethnic community (Albrecht et. al 1996). 
Summary
The complex and interrelated key factors influencing opposition to high risk 
hazardous facilities in rural communities have been widely examined. Opposition to the 
siting of other high risk hazardous facilities, including biolaboratories, should be 
expected to be influenced by similar factors. However, community response to 
biolaboratories has not yet been investigated. Therefore, the previous studies examining 
community opposition to high risk hazardous facilities will inform this study. This 
exploratory study will examine if opposition to a biolaboratory reflects those of other 
high risk hazardous facilities.
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CHAPTER FOUR- METHODOLOGY
The purpose of this study is to explore the degree to which a biolaboratory is 
perceived to be a high risk hazardous facility. Additionally, this study will explore 
community opposition to the IRF expansion at RML in Hamilton, Montana. This study 
will seek to describe the perspectives of those opposed to the project during the period of 
proposed expansion from January 2002 through June 2004. Therefore, in the context of 
what is known about community opposition to high risk hazardous facilities, this study 
will seek to answer the following question: What are the factors that characterize 
community opposition to the ERF expansion at RML?
Research studies on rural, community grassroots opposition to biolaboratories is 
an unexplored topic. Since this topic has not been studied, I will use qualitative 
methodology for this exploratory study. Historical analysis and in-depth interviews were 
the two types of qualitative methodology used in this study. Qualitative methodology is 
useful when seeking to “uncover and understand what lies behind any phenomenon about 
which little is yet known” (Strauss and Corbin 1990:19).
Historical Research
A detailed historiography of RML was created through historical research 
methods. Historical research is “a process that examines events or combination of events 
in order to uncover accounts of what happened in the past” (Berg 2004:234). 
Understanding the history of events, people, and institutions is an important element of 
understanding recent or present situations (Berg 2004).
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The historiography of RM L was compiled by collecting primary and secondary 
data. Primary data were collected from personal communication with one current, and 
two previous, RML scientists. I met with each current or previous RML scientist at 
his/her home, office, or RML. I met with each person once, and our conversations lasted 
approximately one to two hours. During these personal communications, I asked each 
scientist to describe the laboratory’s history including changes in organizational structure, 
safety features, and research agenda. These conversations were not audio tape recorded, 
but I took detailed notes. Within one day after the conversations, I typed my notes from 
the conversations so key information would not be forgotten. I also collected secondary 
data from newspaper articles, magazine articles, books, U.S. Census Bureau documents, 
and RML documents.
In-Depth Interviews 
Sampling
The target population of this study is defined as those residents of Hamilton, 
Montana and the surrounding area who were opposed to the IRF expansion during the 
study period. Residents opposed to the biolaboratory expansion include individuals who 
served as staff or active members of opposition groups, maintained a leadership role in 
the opposition movement, or participated in voicing concerns, writing letters, or some 
other form of active criticism of the expansion.
Purposive and snowball sampling were used to select participants for in-depth 
interviews. Purposive sampling was used first to identify three participants who were key 
leaders of opposition groups on the basis of newspaper coverage. After using purposive 
sampling to identify the first three opponents, snowball sampling was used to identify
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other potential participants for the in-depth interviews. Snowball sampling was used to 
“locate subjects with certain attributes or characteristics” (Berg 2004:36). In this study, I 
used snowball sampling to identify opposed citizens to the IRF expansion at RML. This 
was accomplished by asking participants at the close of each interview to suggest other 
community activists who may have also been opposed to the expansion.
Interviews were conducted until saturation, or the lack of new information 
produced in the interviews, was achieved. Additionally, as I requested names of 
prospective interviewees from participants, their suggestions began to overlap. Overall, I 
found a general willingness by those opposed to the IRF expansion to participate in this 
study. Twelve potential participants were contacted for this study; however, one person 
did not respond and another individual agreed to participate but did not return telephone 
calls to arrange an interview. Thus, a total of 10 interviews were conducted in August, 
September, and November 2005.
In the sample, six individuals were male and four were female. Five of the 
participants lived in Hamilton, Montana, and five lived outside of the Hamilton city 
limits. A total of seven interview participants were members of opposition groups; three 
individuals did not identify themselves as part of any particular group.
The Interview Process
Interviews were conducted to gain an in-depth description of opposed residents’ 
perspectives. I contacted prospective participants on the telephone. After providing a 
short description of the project, I asked potential participants if they considered 
themselves to be opposed to the expansion. If residents identified themselves as opposed 
to the expansion and agreed to participate in the study, a meeting location and time were
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airanged. All interviews were conducted face-to-face at either the Hamilton Public 
Library or the participants’ place of employment or residence. I guaranteed the 
participants confidentiality and the interviews were audio tape-recorded.
The in-depth interviews were semi-structured, which provided flexibility in the 
ordering and wording of questions (Berg 2004). Additionally, I found this strategy 
provided flexibility so that probing questions could be asked to clarify participants’ 
responses and to elicit more information (Berg 2004). An interview guide (see Appendix 
C) was created to provide a general outline for the purposive conversations, although 
because of my semi-structured approach, it was not strictly followed. During the 
interviews, I asked questions about the participant’s concerns with the IRF expansion and 
how he/she expressed those concerns. I also asked participants to describe their opinion 
of the IRF expansion, previous opinion of RML, and how they thought that the approval 
process had affected their community. The interviews ranged from approximately 30 
minutes to 90 minutes in length.
Data Analysis
Data management was the first step in the data analysis process. Before 
transcription, a pseudonym was given to each participant. 1 transcribed each audio tape 
recorded interview verbatim within one week following each interview into Microsoft 
Word. After transcription, I imported the transcription text into the qualitative software 
program NVIVO which I found to be a helpful data management tool. I used the NVIVO 
program to organize, store, and search the data obtained from each in-depth interviews.
The second step of the data analysis process was accomplished by using content 
analysis. This interpretative approach views written documents, such as interview
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transcripts, as “text” that can be condensed, categorized, and compared (Berg 2004). I 
began content analysis by open coding to “open inquiry widely” (Berg 2004:278). Open 
coding is the “naming and categorizing of phenomena through close examination of data” 
(Strauss and Corbin 1990:62). During this process, I examined five interviews line by 
line and asked: what does this text represent? What is the major idea of this line of data? 
For example, one participant said “People are so ignorant though, they just don’t want to 
believe that the government would do something that way or be anything but 
forthcoming.” During open coding, I labeled this sentence in NVIVO as skeptical o f the 
government. Although NVIVO does not analyze data, I used it to create and apply 
themes to the data. After themes were created and labeled to corresponding data, I used 
NVrVO to search and explore the coded data. For example, I could use NVIVO to locate 
each sentence labeled as skeptical o f  the government.
In open coding, I used an inductive approach, which is the process of immersing 
oneself in the data “in order to identify the dimensions or themes” (Berg 2004:272). By 
using this approach, I was able to create my own themes to describe the data. In using 
the open coding strategy to analyze five interview transcripts, 1 created approximately 25 
codes. After analyzing five interviews, the open codes began to overlap. For example, I 
had created the theme skeptical o f  the government and fear government was hiding 
information. As a result of the open coding strategy, themes were not well defined and it 
became difficult to label the data.
The second step of content analysis was axial coding, which is defined as “a set of 
procedures whereby data are put back together in new ways after open coding, by making 
connections between categories” (Stauss and Corbin 1990:96). During axial coding, I
V
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incorporated the deductive approach, whereby categories suggested by the literature 
review were integrated into the content analysis process. This strategy of balancing 
inductive and deductive approaches allowed the creation of categories from the data 
guided by insights from previous studies.
Thus, I examined the codes produced during open coding and compared those to 
themes suggested by the literature review. For example, the previously mentioned code 
skeptical o f  the government was comparable to the theme from the research literature of 
distrust. Furthermore, during axial coding I noted various dimensions of distrust were 
prevalent in the data, including distrust o f  the federal government and distrust o f 
laboratory scientists. I found these dimensions by asking: How are these data similar 
and/or different? Therefore, I was able to define each theme and subsequently code the 
data with these themes. I thus analyzed each of the 10 interview transcripts and labeled 
the data with themes created during axial coding.
Results of the coding analysis process were then compiled based on the 
prevalence of the themes that I identified in the interview data. I used NVIVO to search 
the coded interviews to compile a list of data for each theme. For example, I could 
search for distrust and NVIVO compiled all the data labeled with this theme. I then 
found the prevalence of each theme by counting the number of participants who 
mentioned them. For example, I counted how many out of the 10 interviews included 
data labeled with the theme distrust. Themes were then prioritized from most to least 
prevalent. The results from the content analysis of the interview data, including themes 
organized from most to least prevalent, are presented in the following chapter.
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CHAPTER FIVE- RESULTS
Several themes characterized participants’ opposition to the IRF expansion at 
RML (see Table 4). The prevalence with which participants mentioned any particular 
theme varied. Nevertheless, themes could be organized from most to least frequently 
prevalent in terms of how many participants mentioned a given theme during the in-depth 
interviews. Prevalence was determined by the number of participants who mentioned 
any particular theme during each in-depth interview. This chapter summarizes those 
themes that emerged in terms of the prevalence with which participants expressed them.
Table 4: Prevalence of the themes found to characterize participants* opposition_____
Theme Number of participants who mentioned theme
Negative perception of the IRF
expansion approval process 10
Distrust in institutional authority 9
Negative perception of potential IRF
risks 8
Distrust in the justification for
bioterrorism research 7
Negative perception of the equity of
IRF expansion 7
Perceived lack of economic benefits
from IRF expansion 3
Negative Perception of the IRF Expansion Approval Process
The most prevalent theme found to strongly characterize participants’ descriptions 
of opposition was a negative perception of the public process involved in approving the 
IRF expansion. Participants reported being disappointed, discouraged, and outraged by 
the IRF approval process. One opponent described the approval process as “heinous” ; 
another as a “slap in the face”; and a third as “really crappy”. Every participant 
interviewed expressed concern about the IRF approval process. Thus, a negative
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perception o f the approval process appeared to most strongly characterize each of the 10 
participants’ opposition to the IRF expansion at RML.
Four dimensions of perception of the IRF approval process characterized 
participants’ description of opposition. These dimensions included a perception of a 
predetermined outcome, concern with unaddressed safety issues, an experience with 
unanswered questions, and a sense of feeling powerless.
Perception o f  a Predetermined Outcome
One dimension of the negative perception of the approval process that influenced
participants’ opposition was their perception that the IRF approval process outcome was
predetermined. All of the participants claimed that the outcome of the ERF approval
process had already been decided. Participants expressed discouragement in describing
how they felt that the NIH was determined to locate the BSL IV laboratory at RML and
that the federal government was just “going through the process”. They claimed that the
NIH thought that it could “slip the BSL IV laboratory through” without anyone noticing.
Mr. Adams‘S describes how the decision was “pre-ordained”:
I went through the process of the local stuff and it was obvious from the meetings 
and talking to people here that it [IRF approval process] was pre-ordained. The 
government and the lab had already made the decision they were going to build it 
[BSL rv  laboratory] here no matter what the locals said, no matter what the state 
said. It is obvious from the meetings and from these people that it is going to go 
through no matter what.
 ̂A ll participants were previously assigned pseudonym s to insure their anonymity, so quotations around 
long, direct quotes are not included. Additionally, their organizational af filiation and other key 
characteristics that could identify the participants have been dropped or modified to insure their 
confidentiality.
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Similarly, Ms. Peterson claimed that the outcome had been predetermined:
There was a ton of examples that we pulled together. Just the way they [RML 
and NIH]^ were talking about it was like this is what we are going to do. They 
came and presented it [IRF expansion] that early meeting as we are building this 
here. It wasn’t we are proposing, but we are building this here.
Thus, participants described how they believed that the outcome of the public
process to approve the IRF expansion as predetermined and expressed how it had
impacted their opposition. As Ms. Peterson noted, “That [the public process] was
something that made a lot o f people angry. How valid is the process if you already made
this decision?”
Concern with Unaddressed Safety Issues
Another dimension that opponents’ expressed in their dissatisfaction with the IRF
approval process was that the safety issues that they were concerned about had not been
addressed. Every participant noted at least one, if not many, safety issues with the BSL
IV laboratory. Mr. Green questioned, “The main concern for me was safety. . .  Were
they [RML] going to be safe”?
Participants expressed concerns about a wide variety of safety issues. For
example, five participants questioned whether the security at RML was adequate,
especially in preventing a terrorist intrusion to obtain biological agents or in avoiding a
possible terrorist attack on RML. Mr. Potter noted, “This has got to be one of the softest
targets anywhere”, and noted the laboratory’s vulnerability to “either whackos or
terrorists”. Ms. Moore also was concerned with a perceived lack of RML security:
The terrorist thing [September 11, 2001] recently happened and there is just like 
this little chain linked fence around there [RML]. It is just-there is no safety.
® During the interviews, participants often used the term “they” when referring to those overseeing the IRF 
expansion. It is unclear whether participants were referring to RML, NIH, or both. Thus, because o f this 
am biguity, I have noted both RM L and NIH.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
48
And then I said how hard would it be to go blow that place up? Or like do 
anything to it. You could totally breach that system. It’s not— I mean I could— 
and I’m Joe public and I don’t know anything about any of that but it would not 
be hard. No, they [RML and NIH] didn’t talk about it.
Five participants expressed concern that the laboratory’s emergency plan in the
event of an accident or release o f a BSL TV agent would fail. Ms. Peterson explained:
What we wanted was basically proof that or a good argument from the lab they 
could handle emergencies associated with the BL four. This was part of the 
public process and part of the EIS, but it was like okay we can’t really decide if 
we are for or against this thing. We just want to know if you are prepared for it.
If it turns out you are inadequately prepared for it, then we are probably against it. 
If you can prove that, yes, we have thought about all these contingencies. We 
have the infrastructure in place. We have a really good emergency plan that can 
handle it. Then we can come out in favor of it. We still don’t have that 
information.
Four participants also expressed concern that the community might lack adequate
infrastructure to handle an accident or release of a BSL IV agent. Mr. Potter noted:
Accidents do happen even in the best of situations, so I think a facility like that 
[BSL rv  laboratory] for that reason should not be built in a residential area. The 
infrastructure in Hamilton is insufficient to handle some big outbreak.
Three participants, including Mr. Potter, expressed concern about the transport of
infected people to other locations in the event of an accident:
Instead of spending what it would have cost to bring the Marcus Daly hospital up 
to specs to deal with a patient that might be infected with stuff coming out of that 
lab, instead of doing it here in Hamilton where presumably the potentially bigger 
danger lies, the plan is to ship them clear to Missoula. Because Missoula already 
had a facility that was going to be cheaper to upgrade— well, hell with that money 
we are talking people’s lives. And Highway 93 is famous for accidents. So here 
you are going to have a person that maybe has Ebola in back of a regular 
ambulance clear up to Missoula. Well, there is a possibility to have Ebola spread 
down the highway.
Similarly, two participants also expressed concern about the safety of transporting 
pathogens to the laboratory. Mr. Hill explained:
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Even the transport of pathogens coming into this BL four. A lot of the people that 
were citizen liaison members for the lab—picked by the lab—at the meetings had 
no idea that these pathogens were transported through FedEx. The same trucks 
that deliver your packages are delivering those .. .You know we have NIH 
security at the lab that we never had before. It would be really nice to think that 
they are the ones responsible for transport from airport to lab direct, instead of it 
being handled throughout the whole valley in a FedEx truck.
Although expressions about safety issues varied widely, participants appeared
dissatisfied in how their safety concerns were being addressed by the public process
established to approve the IRF expansion. Each participant complained about the
inadequacies of the Environmental Assessment (EA) and the multiple drafts of the
Environmental Impact Statement (EIS). Participants claimed that these procured
documents did not properly address the safety issues associated with the BSL IV
laboratory. Mr. Davis, as well as other participants, complained about the EIS that the
NIH had released:
In their environmental impact statements, they [RML and NIH] would look at 
what are the safety impacts? What are the environmental impacts of this lab?
And essentially they were saying there are none. We provided them with 70 
pages of impacts for them to look over and consider. When we get [other federal 
government] EIS on large proposals, they usually run about 700 to 1000 pages. 
What we got was about a 40 or 50 page little document that essentially said there 
aren’t any impacts.
Mr. Davis noted that the EIS was “about a 40 or 50 page” document, and three
other participants also commented specifically about how they perceived the size of the
report to be exceptionally small. For example, Ms. Jackson complained that the
environmental assessment was “inadequate” and only “one eighth or quarter of an inch”:
They [RML and NIH] didn’t do an adequate environmental assessment to begin 
with. They did a very shoddy job. We asked them to do another one, and then an 
environmental impact statement and then 1 think they did— I even lost track— the 
EA, the EIS, and all that but there were several, several times we asked them— 
this is just not adequate. When we got the first one it was maybe one eighth or 
quarter of an inch big. For something like the highway [93] project, they had
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mounds and mounds of paperwork on that for environmental impact statement.
So you would think something this big, and this is the government, this is 
National Institute of Health, NIA ID that they would think ahead and do 
something adequate to begin with. But they just didn’t. They just didn’t.
Five participants also expressed disappointment in how their concerns about
safety issues were overlooked by the RML Community Liaison Group (CLG). They also
expressed disapproval in how RML had formed the CLG (see page 24 for the earlier
discussion of the formation of the CLG). As Mr. Potter noted, “the people at Rocky
Mountain Lab had selected them [CLG] because of their support of the lab.’’ Participants
claimed that they did not think their concerns could be addressed by the CLG because it
was dominated by “cheerleaders” for the IRF expansion. In the words of one participant,
Mr. Green:
The citizen’s advisory group is appointed. So much for representation since 
it is appointed. They invited, I think they invited [opposition group] on it 
because they were the quote [type of environmental group]. First thing we said is 
it doesn’t represent—where is [opposition group], why aren’t they at the table? 
Why aren’t they at the table? It wasn’t democratic. It was a stacked deck.
Five participants also expressed discouragement with how the CLG meetings
functioned. They claimed that participants felt the meetings offered few opportunities for
public participation. For example, Mr. Hill described the CLG:
It [community liaison meeting] was run from the lab. It was done in the lab and 
so as a spectator if you wanted to get in you would have to call prior. You would 
be able to sit behind [community liaison members] but you could not ask any 
questions or participate in any way. Only the citizens of the liaison could bring in 
questions from the community.
In sum, participants explained how the CLG meetings, which had been designed 
to increase communication between RML and the community, did not address their 
safety concerns. Ms. Brooks commented that the CLG meetings “were a joke. Anybody 
who was on that would tell you it was a joke.”
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Experiences with Unanswered Questions
Frequently, participants noted how their safety concerns were unaddressed by the 
IRF approval process because o f unanswered questions. Six participants expressed 
discouragement in how many of their questions were unanswered by the approval 
process. For example, Ms. Moore said she had questioned what would happen in the 
event of an emergency, and she noted that “they [RML and NIH] didn’t have an answer. 
They had no idea.”
Participants described how their questions frequently went unanswered, and they
described how the lack of information angered them. Mr. Smith noted that the lack of
information “set people o f f ’:
I knew that at the first meeting getting any information out of them [RML and 
NIH], it was obvious that they weren’t giving any information. That was really 
what set people off. Right at the beginning.
Later in the interview, Mr. Smith continued:
Then they [RML] held a meeting, that is, a public meeting was organized by the 
Rocky Mountain Lab and people attended and most of them had only known 
about it for three or four days at the tim e .. . we were bothered by the fact that 
they didn’t know anything. We were bothered even more after the meeting 
because we were asking questions and we were told we are not here to answer 
questions, we are here to take comments. That was the formula that they were 
using. They had no information to give out about it [IRF expansion] except for 
some pictures that they had some renderings. Nothing much about the impacts. 
Nothing much about how in would affect the community or anything else.
Participants explained how in the course of the IRF approval process safety issues
and questions remained unanswered. Thus, as their concerns were trivialized, their anger
increased. For example, Ms. Brooks noted:
Actually my really main concern was the process. 1 felt, and I spoke at a couple 
of meetings, I felt it was a done deal. That they [RML and NIH] really-the 
whole process that they went through was really for show. I don’t feel like it ever 
had—they were just going through the motions. To add insult to injury, at the end
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of two or three meetings they would serve us cookies.. . [Lab personnel] would 
say, ‘Well we need to stop now so we can have coffee and cookies,’ And it was 
like give me a break. I really felt that they were very condescending. That they 
really were just going through the motions. I have to say as the process went on I 
probably got a little angrier. Especially when they kept feeding us cookies.
Sense o f Feeling Powerlessness
Seven participants described a sense of feeling powerless as the IRF approval 
process unfolded. Four participants specifically referred to the IRF approval process as a 
“game”, and two participants noted that the process was like “banging your head against 
the wall”.
Participants described feeling powerless because they said that the approval
process was predetermined, ignored their safety concerns, and left their questions
unaddressed. They claimed that the opinions of local residents, including themselves,
were ignored. Mr. Hill said, “They were ramming this down our throat. They were
giving us no options in the matter; it wasn’t brought to the people to begin with.”
Similarly, Ms. Moore noted:
No, I mean it was hideous. They [RML and NIH] didn’t listen. They didn’t care 
what any of the locals said. I mean they tried to sidestep so much of the issue and 
wouldn’t answer questions. It Just wasn’t a two-way dialogue at all. It really 
never w as.. . And yet they are not willing to meet us at the table as a community 
member. I live [in Hamilton], this is my concern— what can we do? They 
wouldn’t even talk about it. It is crazy. It was really discouraging, like beating 
your head against a wall. . . They were like it doesn’t matter what you people 
think. We are doing this. We are the U.S. government.
Ms. Jackson described how her sense of powerlessness contributed to her opposition and
involvement:
I became, for a lack of better words, obsessed. Because I was just seeing so much 
deceit and I felt there was so much injustice. And I knew that people here felt 
like they didn’t have a voice. . . I think 1 was feeling a little powerless, and that is 
why I started to get involved. As we were going to more meetings at the lab, we 
felt like they were playing a game. I felt like they were playing a game.
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Distrust in Institutional Authority
In addition to a negative perception of the IRF expansion approval process at 
RML, participants’ opposition to the IRF expansion was characterized by strong distrust 
in institutional authority. Three dimensions of distrust in institutional authority 
characterized participants’ expression of opposition to the IRF expansion. One 
dimension was distrust in the “experts”, or laboratory scientists at RML. The second 
dimension was distrust in the federal government in managing RML. Finally, 
participants expressed distrust in information about RML as sources of reliable 
information were often rumors and stories.
Distrust o f  Laboratory Scientists
Participants expressed skepticism of the “expert” scientists at RML. Nine of the 
10 participants expressed distrust in the scientists at RML and said that their distrust had 
contributed to their opposition to the IRF expansion. One participant, Ms. Moore, 
described her perception of RML scientists when she said, “We are these wonderful 
scientists. How could we go wrong? Shame on you for not trusting us. I was just like 
whoa.”
Some participants claimed that experts from RML and NIH used their position 
and scientific knowledge to persuade residents to support the IRF expansion. One 
participant, Ms. Brooks, called the experts “big-wigs” and said they “could talk circles 
around the average Bitterrooter.” Part of the distrust in laboratory scientists arose as 
participants claimed that the IRF approval process had become controlled by experts. 
Mr. Smith explained:
It [IRF approval process] became run by a professional back in Bethesda. They
used every little nuance like everybody’s a doctor; doctor this, doctor that makes
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these pronouncements. They are supposed to be scientific and everything I knew 
very well that they weren’t.
Participants expressed distrust in laboratory scientists in noting that they are “just
human” and “humans make mistakes all the time.” Mr. Potter noted that the scientists
were “very fallible.” Most participants said that they questioned the experts’ knowledge
and noted that human mistakes were inevitable in the laboratory, even by expert
scientists. The inevitability of mistakes at RML was described by Mr. Potter:
I know that people make blunders everyday at their jobs and there is not a fool­
proof system. If people are lackadaisical there will be mistakes made. It is 
just inevitable.
In contrast to most participants accepting the inevitability of human error at RML,
some reported that the laboratory scientists had made contradicting declarations. These
participants described how the experts claimed that mistakes at RML would not happen.
According to them, the experts claimed mistakes in the “super high-tech” laboratory were
impossible. Ms. Peterson explained:
There wasn’t terribly good documentation, and they [RML and NIH] didn’t 
provide very much, of any one ever making a mistake at the lab before. And of 
course no one has ever made a mistake at a level four and they had all these 
inaccurate assumptions.
The expert role was challenged as mistakes that occurred at RML were revealed. 
Participants noted how during the IRF approval process, several historical mistakes that 
had occurred at RML, or errors for which RML was responsible, had become public. For 
example, participants described the deaths of research monkeys from a thermostat 
malfunction, an unidentified object found on RML property, and RML waste disposal 
buried at a nearby landfill. Often, participants described these events in the context of the
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probability of future mistakes happening at RML. For example, Ms. Jackson described
how opponents had discovered such events and revealed the “truth” to the public;
I was trying to get a lot of the truth out, and there were a lot of things we 
discovered that were made public. RML was a superfund site. When they dug up 
to start building for the level three, they discovered buried ash pits with old 
debris in it. They found a pile or a hole with old vaccine vials buried from years 
ago. We also discovered that RML along with Corixa lab had contributed to the 
Victor landfill, which was also a superfund. They were dumping their chemicals 
there .. .  So these things just started coming to the surface during our research.
Participants also expressed disapproval in how RML had handled such events.
Mr. Hill described in detail one event at the laboratory and how he distrusted the way the
problem had been handled:
There have been a lot of mistakes over at the lab people weren’t really privy to. 
One of the things that had happened—basically in the newspapers and the way it 
was reported—was they [RML] found an item that was out by the fence line. An 
unidentified item and they had handled according to protocol and that the bomb 
squad in Missoula was contacted.. . And in the newspaper it came out that is was 
handled through protocol, basically that they [RML] did a good job. . .  And not 
only was it taken into the security shack, mishandled, shouldn’t have been 
touched in the first place. . . But that is how the thing kind of came about, but yet 
in the papers you read how they do everything by protocol and it’s done real nice 
and everything else.
Several participants expressed concern about both the potential frequency of high
risk incidents and the subsequent potentially poor incident response at the BSL IV
laboratory. They expressed distrust in the ability of RML to prevent and respond to
future accidents or errors once it became a BSL IV laboratory. Ms. Jackson noted:
There were people that got sick that worked at the lab, tuberculosis for instance. 
These people were part of the community. They were out there in the community. 
So the potential for—if they are that careless with something as non-lethal as 
tuberculosis—how careful or cautious would they be with things that are more 
deadly?
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Distrust in the Federal Government
Distrust in the federal government, which manages RML, was a theme often
expressed by participants in describing their opposition to the IRF expansion. Seven of
the 10 participants expressed distrust in the federal government and its ability to manage
RML. Frequently, when participants spoke of the federal government, they noted that a
person would have to be “naïve” or “crazy” to trust the government. This distrust was
contextualized in their description of how the federal government is not honest and “does
bad things”. For example, Ms. Moore explained how she did not understand why people
would trust the government:
So, we just couldn’t believe it that they [federal government] were going to try to 
do that [build a BSL IV laboratory]. But then at the same time we were already 
aware o f what the U.S. government is up to, so it really didn’t surprise us once we 
started thinking about i t . . . People are so ignorant though, they just don’t want to 
believe that the government would do something that way or be anything but 
forthcoming and on the up and up. Which is crazy that people still think that.
Participants described how their distrust in the federal government increased as
the approval process had progressed. Some noted a growing belief that the government
was ignoring laws and hiding information during the expansion approval process. For
example, Mr. Davis described how his organization had sued the NIH because it would
not provide internal documents that they were requesting under the Freedom of
Information Act (FOIA). As a result, he felt the government was “hiding” things:
They [NIH] didn’t actually admit that they were wrong, but they furnished the 
documents and gave us all o f our attorney’s fees. Which to me, and our 
organization was a victory and it validated what we were saying and that they 
were trying to hide things.
Two participants also expressed distrust in the federal government in describing 
how irregularities in the RML water and sewer bill were discovered during the IRF
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approval process. One participant, Mr. Smith, described in detail how he discovered the
billing irregularities, in which by his calculations, RML owed the city of Hamilton
approximately $1 million. Another participant, Mr. Adams, also noted the water and
sewer billing discrepancies and said:
Let me tell you something about the lab. This will tell you something about our 
government. In all the years the lab has been there, they haven’t paid their sewer 
and water bill completely. There is like hundreds of thousands of dollars that they 
want us to write off. This is our government. If our government won’t pay their 
water bill, how can we trust them to do anything right? Do you trust anybody that 
won’t pay their bills? No.
Distrust in Rumors and Stories
Another dimension of distrust expressed by participants was the lack of reliable 
information about RML as a result of the number of rumors and stories about the 
laboratory circulating within Hamilton and surrounding communities. Six of the 10 
participants mentioned that people in the community had circulated rumors and stories 
about RML. Ms. Jackson commented, “There were rumors you would hear around town, 
back in the 40s, so and so got sick with such and such. But you know you hear rumors.” 
Although participants did not suggest that they believed these rumors and stories, they 
expressed distrust in the information about RML that was disseminated through such 
narratives.
All of the rumors and stories participants shared where about how the laboratory
had caused sickness within the community. They recounted that some stories about
laboratory workers becoming sick and other stories about community members, not
associated with the laboratory, becoming sick. For example, Mr. Green noted:
There are stories for the people that lived here long time ago. The old people that 
grew up here will claim that kids, who played outside the school next to the lab— 
go to a cancer study and you will find that there is a real correlation.
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Several other participants noted that such rumors were inevitably going to 
circulate in the community about RML. They claimed that this was a result of the 
laboratory “hiding things” as a result of RML’s overall lack of honesty with the public. 
Ms. Moore noted “you know you hear things and things have happened in there [RML] 
that they don’t—they come up, they don’t tell you about, they don’t tell anybody about. 
Things like that.”
Negative Perception of Potential IRF Risks
A third theme that characterized participants’ descriptions of their opposition was 
their negative perception of risks that the BSL TV laboratory posed to public health and 
safety. Participants claimed that the IRF expansion, specifically the BSL IV laboratory, 
would entail a high degree of risk. Ms. Jackson noted, “Originally, there is the knee jerk 
thing where you hear Biolevel IV lab— oh, my gosh what is a Biolevel IV lab?” Two 
dimensions of negative risk perception were expressed by participants as characterizing 
their opposition. These included their fear of the unknown and their dread in potential 
events.
Fear o f the Unknown
Seven participants expressed concern about the numerous “unknowns” associated 
with the BSL IV laboratory. They described the “unknowns” of the BSL IV laboratory in 
terms of ambiguity o f what could happen if a biological agent was released into the 
community. For example, when Ms. Brooks spoke about the event of an accidental 
biological agent release, she said, “Well, we don’t know what is going to happen. We 
really don’t know.”
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Participants who described the “unknowns” of the BSL IV laboratory posed the 
questions as to what if a biological agent got loose? What would happen? How would 
RML and the community respond? What would you do? They described their negative 
risk perception as elevated because of these “unknowns”. For example, Ms. Jackson 
said;
So I started researching on the internet and realized the things that they [RML and 
NIH] could possibly bring in. For instance, Ebola. For instance, anthrax. For 
instance, possibly small pox, even though they said they couldn’t do that by law. 
So I was worried about things that they were going to bring in and what if 
something got loose? What if the community were exposed to these things?
What if a lab worker had been exposed and contracted some disease? What if 
during the expansion, the building of the project, something happened and 
something was released into the river? Because they are right next to the river, 
they are in the flood plain. What if some animals were injured in the building of 
the project?
Participants said that as they grappled with these “unknowns”, their negative risk
perceptions about the IRF expansion increased. Additionally, participants described how
their negative risk perceptions increased since they felt RML provided few answers to
their questions about the “unknowns”. Ms. Moore noted;
It is just ridiculous. I mean we have no isolation rooms at Marcus Daly. We 
can’t treat somebody with tuberculosis because the whole hospital would get 
infected. So I mean, what would we do? What would you do...so I asked this 
question to one o f the people there: what would you do if somebody had a 
heart attack in one of the rooms [at RML]? I mean, what would you do? They 
wouldn’t answer it. I don’t know, you don’t know. Would you call life flight? 
Would you want our EMS to transport them? What would you do? They didn’t 
have an answer, they had no idea.
Dread in Potential Accidents
Participants often expressed dread in describing the perceived risks of a BSL IV 
laboratory. Seven of the 10 participants described how they dreaded the BSL IV 
laboratory, particularly the accidental release of biological agents into the community.
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Participants noted “massive deaths” and “devastation” could happen in the community if
pathogens were released from RML. One participant, Mr. Adams, said “If they get out, it
is a catastrophic thing.” Mr. Green also noted, “There were basically just fear of germs
escaping and a massive disaster of people dying.”
Five participants expressed concern that a major accident would eventually occur.
Participants described their dread of an accidental release of an agent from RML.
Additionally, participants thought an accidental release of an agent was inevitable. For
example, Mr. Hill commented:
But it [agent release from RML] is going to happen. We know it is going to 
happen. So it is just a matter of when. And how far it goes. Is in contained or 
not?
Ms. Moore also commented that an accidental release from the BSL IV was inevitable:
I think once something [agent release from RML] does happen, which I think it is 
just a matter of time, five years or 35 years, or 50 years. I don’t know. But 
definitely, how could it not?
Participants also speculated about what could happen in the event of an accidental
agent release from RML. Three participants, including Mr. Adams, spoke openly about
the potential outcome of potential accidents:
If it [agent release for RML] is in this little valley and an accident happens, word 
gets out. They [federal government] can sterilize this valley very quickly.
They can use fuel air mixture devices and sterilize this valley and everything in it 
very quickly. People say our government wouldn’t do that. Well, if you were the 
president and they [government officials] came to you and said ‘it’s loose in that 
valley’. We can kill 30,000 or we can allow two billion to die, what would you 
do? Would you sterilize the valley? You would have to.
Distrust in the Justification for Bioterrorism Research
A forth theme that characterized participants’ descriptions of their opposition was 
distrust in the justification for bioterrorism research. Seven of the 10 participants
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described how their opposition had been characterized by skepticism of bioterrorism 
research. These participants explained how they questioned the motivation behind 
bioterrorism research conducted in a BSL IV laboratory. Additionally, they also 
explained how they questioned the need for bioterrorism research in general.
Questioning the Motivation fo r  Bioterrorism Research
One dimension of distrust in the justification for bioterrorism research was the
questioning of the motivation for bioterrorism research. These seven participants
described how they thought the “fear of terrorism”, rather than an actual threat of
terrorism, was the driving purpose of the IRF expansion. Ms. Jackson explained:
The people that were involved in our [opposition] groups—were people who 
were—may have seen or considered or thought that this [BSL IV construction] 
was a knee jerk reaction and more money was being poured into it by the 
government to supposedly protect us from terrorists. I think a lot of people, well 
in my circle, thought that it was kind of a knee jerk reaction and that it wasn’t 
really necessary. It wasn’t going to really affect us directly as far as terrorism 
goes.
In addition, Mr. Green described how the IRF expansion had been based on fear:
It is actually a project that had been thought about before 9/11, but it rode in on 
the back of 9/11 in some sense in terms of the rhetoric. It rode on the back of 
patriotism, and the fear part of 9/11.
Mr. Hill also described how he thought fear of bioterrorism was a driving force of the
project, but he also noted that “fear of the lab wasn’t an issue” because:
It was always a fear of well now the terrorist type of activities, 9 /11 and type of 
stuff that we [federal government] need to start doing this research for our own 
safety. . . So their [RML and NIH] own side, and this is what I was having 
difficulty of getting around through to them, they were using fear to push through 
a BL I V . . .  So they used fear to get it, but yet when it came down to fear as far as 
the lab itself—safety or anything else—then that wasn’t an issue.
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Questioning the Need fo r  Bioterrorism Research
As participants described how they questioned the motivation for bioterrorism 
research, they also explained how they questioned the actual need for bioterrorism 
research. However, participants’ beliefs that bioterrorism research was needed varied. 
Three participants specifically expressed that bioterrorism research should not be done, 
while two participants supported bioterrorism research. Five participants did not express 
either positive or negative opinions about bioterrorism research.
Those participants that expressed bioterrorism research should not be done said 
they were skeptical of what the federal government would do with the results. Primarily, 
they were opposed to bioterrorism research because they feared it could be used to create 
biological weapons. Mr. Davis described how he was concerned about bioterrorism 
research:
I believe in good science and good research. I think RML does a lot of good stuff 
over there. I can’t say I am opposed to good research, of course the problem is 
when you start doing research on agents that have either been weaponized or that 
are potential biological weapons. Once you start setting those organisms in that 
framework, you become part of the problem. One thing is for certain in science 
that information will ultimately go out and be used by somebody to hurt 
somebody. I think that was what happened in the anthrax attacks. The strain of 
anthrax that was used was the AIMS strain which was developed by the U.S. 
military. The one bioterrorism attack that we had in our country came from 
within our own country, an organism that had been engineered by our government 
for biological warfare. I think that really says a lot about how we need to be 
cautious in terms of the kinds of research that we do and for what reasons.
Similarly, Ms. Moore described her disapproval of bioterrorism research:
What they [RML and NIH] didn’t really say until part way through this [IRF 
expansion approval process], was this is part of the homeland security deal 
funding. It is not public health. It is not the public health of the United States 
they are looking at, it is a defense contract. We are—they [RML scientists] are 
going to be building bombs there. Or at least the technology to make them 
somewhere else. And why wouldn’t they? It is just way too scary. What the
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ethics of that? I mean, come on. We [federal government] are planning on killing 
people with these horrible, wretched, torturous diseases. It is awful.
However, two participants claimed that they supported bioterrorism research.
When I asked if Mr. Potter if he thought the federal government should conduct
bioterrorism research, he commented;
I 100% agree. That is why I say build it [BSL IV laboratory] in a secure location. 
Go down to Nevada’s test site. We [federal government] already have all the 
borders. We got the buffer zones. We got the security. There is a jillion acres out 
there. Build it there. That would make sense. But we need them [BSL IV 
laboratories].
Although perceptions for the need for bioterrorism research varied, most
participants claimed that their community was not an appropriate location for a BSL IV
laboratory. In fact, many participants noted that research should be conducted elsewhere,
such as in the desert or at a military facility. For example, Ms. Brooks noted the
laboratory should be located in a “protected area”;
I think Hamilton is the last place that a Biolevel four lab should be. I believe that 
it needs to be in a protected area. I think it is highly inappropriate here.
Negative Perception o f the E quity  of IR F Expansion
In addition to distrust in the justification for bioterrorism research, a negative 
perception of the equity of the IRF expansion at RML was also a prevalent theme 
characterizing participants’ opposition to the IRF expansion. However, a negative 
perception of equity was a unidimensional theme. Seven participants claimed that 
Hamilton, Montana was intentionally selected for the BSL IV because it was a rural 
locale. Reasons that participants suggested for why rural Montana was selected included 
the “rural mindset” and a sparse population.
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Participants described how it was unfair that their community was selected to host
the BSL IV laboratory simply because it was a rural area. Mr. Hill noted, “I think that
they [federal government] looked at this small community and said that this community
will be a pushover.” Participants’ often described how they perceived that their
community had been unfairly selected to host the BSL IV laboratory and how that
characterized their opposition. Ms. Moore commented:
They [federal government] strategically picked this location because of the rural 
mindset. And they already have this rinky-dink little campus [RML] with extra 
land they could easily acquire. You could pay off anybody in this town for their 
land. So they had done that. They strategically picked this place because they 
know about rural communities and the lack of our voices in numbers and in 
strength and that’s why they picked it. No, 1 mean it was hideous. They didn’t 
listen.
Five participants explained how their perception of equity was impacted by a NIH 
internal memorandum in which reasons for why RML had been selected for the BSL IV 
laboratory were listed. According to participants, this memorandum had been obtained 
from the NIH by one of the opposition groups during the approval process, and it stated 
that their community was intentionally selected because it was rural. Mr. Davis 
explained that:
We were interested in all kinds of internal NIH documents about the lab and one 
of the documents that we had was a memo from NIH that laid the rationale for 
building the lab. Part of the rationale was because it was in a rural community far 
removed from population centers. In the event of an accidental release of a BL 
four agent, it would be minimal impact to the community as opposed to a major 
metropolitan area . . . Basically it said we in this valley are pretty much 
sacrificial. They [federal government] knew that, they knew they could shut this 
valley down if something like that was to happen.
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Another dimension of participants’ concerns about equity was the high quality of
life in Hamilton, Montana. Four participants claimed that the community had been
selected because it was a desirable place for laboratory scientists to live compared to
other locations. Ms. Brooks theorized:
I think that the choice of putting it in Hamilton— I just feel it is an inappropriate 
place for a Biolevel four lab. I know why they do it, which is it is attractive to the 
PhDs that come here. The scientists want to live in a community and don’t 
want to live on some base out in the middle of the desert.
Another reason that three opponents expressed as to why their community had
been intentionally selected included the possibility of containment and quarantine in the
narrow Bitterroot valley. Mr. Potter said:
I knew why they [RML and NIH] were doing it here because there are only a few 
thousand of us living in the area. It would be way easy to quarantine the 
Bitterroot. Heck, if up there by Missoula they just put a roadblock. There are no 
roads around that.
The relatively low population in rural Montana was another reason why two
participants claimed that their community had been unfairly selected. Mr. Adams noted;
The one [biosafety laboratory] up by Boston, that one will never open as a level 
four. A lot of people up there. Here, who cares? You have to sterilize 30,000 
people— hey that is better than Boston or New York or Washington. They don’t 
want it in their backyard. They have the votes to do it. That is why the lab is 
h e re .. . It will only kill a few thousand people.
Perceived Lack of Economic Benefits from IRF expansion
Another prevalent unidimensional theme that characterized participants’ 
descriptions o f their opposition to the IRF expansion was the perceived lack of economic 
benefits from IRF expansion. This theme characterized three of the 10 opponents to the 
IRF expansion at RML. These participants noted that laboratory proponents stressed the 
economic potential of the expansion, but they claimed that the economic impact would
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not be positive for individuals or the community. For example, Mr. Smith described how
he perceived economic benefits:
In fact, they [RML and NIH] were pitching it as an economic benefit to the 
community because people would be coming here to work at the lab. They would 
be buying homes and paying taxes. They said these would be the impacts and so 
on. . .  So it won’t have an economic benefit to the city. In fact, the impact will 
probably be negative.
Similarly, Mr. Adams noted:
They hung $66 million in front of the people. If you look at a little 
community like this and they [community residents] say $66 million!? But you 
know they did not understand that to build that lab, it is a very specialized 
company. They bring in their own materials. They bring in their own people. 
Very little will be here. To put the equipment in, that all comes from somewhere 
else. They send their own people to install it. They might hire, when it is all 
done, hire six more people in the valley. Well that is ridiculous but that is the 
way it is. Sixty-five of that 66 million will go out of state.
On the other hand, three opponents claimed that the laboratory expansion would
provide economic benefits to the community. However, they described how they
disregarded potential economic benefits because of perceived “problems” that could
result from the expansion. For example, Mr. Hill said “Not that it won’t be really
beneficial for the economy having this type of workforce here, but the risk.” Mr. Potter
expressed similar concerns:
Why should they [community residents] be in favor of it? Yeah, it brings— there 
are some benefits— like these intelligent people come in and there are the benefits 
of the payroll. That is hard to see and pretty evident with some of problems. 
Especially potential problems.
Conclusion
Overall, several themes were found to characterize participants’ opposition to the 
IRF expansion at RML. These multidimensional themes included a negative perception 
of the IRF expansion approval process, distrust in institutional authority, a negative
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perception of potential IRF risks, and distrust in the justification for bioterrorism
research. Unidimensional themes included a negative perception of the equity of IRF
expansion and a perceived lack of economic benefits from IRF expansion. However, the
extent to which each theme reportedly influenced each participant’s opposition varied.
As a result, the opposition movement, particularly within and between opposition groups,
was not unified. For example, Mr. Potter explained:
So, our organization was sort of split. There were people that were just very 
opposed to the whole concept of doing biological warfare research. Then others 
were not so concerned about the actual project but were very concerned that at 
least the law would be followed in terms of developing an environmental impact 
statement and following the NEPA process. So some of it was philosophical and 
some of it had to do with the la w .. . We thought that we didn’t have agreement in 
our organization so we thought it would be best just to stick to being a watchdog 
group and insuring the NIH followed all of the environmental regulations that 
were required for a project of this magnitude.
The lack of unification across the general opposition movement was also apparent
between opposition groups. As Mr. Green explained, opposition groups had reached a
compromise before mediation with the NIH in part because of their fragmented opposing
views towards the IRF expansion:
[Opposition group] wanted the NEPA process and the other groups wanted it 
gone. [Opposition groups] were really concerned about the objective of the 
outcome and [other opposition group] were interested in the process outcome.
That became a big conflict in the end when the compromise came. Cause you had 
to give up the NEPA in order to get an objective compromise.
In conclusion, although a variety of themes were found to characterize opposition
to the IRF expansion at RML, the extent to which each theme reportedly influenced
participants’ opposition varied. This variation in opposition is discussed in the next
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chapter. The implications of this opposition to the IRF expansion at RML are also 
framed in the context of addressing whether opposition to a biolaboratory supports what 
is known about a community response to a high risk hazardous facility.
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CHAPTER SIX- DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
The major research question addressed in this study was whether a biolaboratory 
is perceived to be a high risk hazardous facility by community members of Hamilton, 
Montana. Since 1927, RML in Hamilton has pursued scientific infectious disease 
research funded by the federal government. The current IRF expansion project at RML, 
which will include a BSL IV research laboratory, is funded by bioterrorism monies 
appropriated to the NIAID in 2001. In the BSL IV laboratory, scientists will be able to 
study the most deadly infectious diseases, some which may be potential bioterrorism 
weapons.
Therefore, the IRF expansion project at RML, which will include a BSL IV 
laboratory, was considered a representative case of a high risk biolaboratory for 
exploration. As the early and recent history of RML summarized in this study has 
demonstrated, some residents in Hamilton and the surrounding communities have viewed 
RML over the past 80 years as a high risk hazardous facility. In this study, the factors 
characterizing community opposition to the most recent expansion at RML are reviewed.
Similarly, this study addressed what themes might describe community opposition 
to a biolaboratory as a high risk hazardous facility and whether these themes might 
correspond to the key factors that previously have been found to explain community 
opposition to other types of high risk hazardous facilities. Although community 
opposition to high risk hazardous facilities has been widely examined, residents’ 
perceptions of biolaboratories, as another type of a high risk hazardous facility, have not 
yet been explored. This exploratory study aimed to examine if themes characterizing
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participants’ opposition to a biolaboratory reflected the factors previously identified in 
studies of other high risk hazardous facilities.
RML as a High Risk Hazardous Facility
Several key events have historically characterized a view by many Bitterroot 
Valley residents that RML is a high risk hazardous facility. Before the establishment of 
RML, early spotted fever research was a dangerous endeavor in the Bitterroot Valley 
because of the high mortality rate. Over a period of 16 years of early spotted fever 
research, five researchers became infected with the disease and died (Philips 2000). In 
the early 1900s, local ranchers resisted tick eradication efforts as they destroyed with 
dynamite two arsenic dipping vats designed to eradicate ticks from the valley’s cattle 
population (Philips 2000). Additionally, two local residents employed by the state to 
operate arsenic dipping vats died as they contracted spotted fever during this dangerous 
operation (Philips 2000).
In 1927, laboratory construction of a new spotted fever research facility in 
Hamilton, Montana was strongly opposed by local residents. Concerned residents feared 
that ticks with spotted fever would escape the facility, and threaten residents’ health. 
Local residents opposed to the laboratory construction viewed it as a high risk hazardous 
facility. Although the laboratory was eventually built, resident fears were reportedly 
alleviated by the construction of a small, water-filled moat around the facility that would 
prevent ticks from escaping the laboratory.
As the history of RML reveals, the recent opposition to the IRF expansion is not 
the first time community residents’ have opposed laboratory plans. RML, which local
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residents refer to as the “tick lab”, has been viewed as a high risk hazardous facility by 
many residents of the Bitterroot Valley for numerous years.
Themes Characterizing Opposition to the IRF Expansion at RML
The complex and interrelated factors characterizing opposition to high risk 
hazardous facilities in communities have been widely examined. Themes that 
participants expressed in describing their opposition to the IRF expansion at RML 
reflected factors that previously have been found to explain negative responses to 
proposed and existing high risk hazardous facilities. The themes found to characterize 
participants’ opposition to the IRF expansion at RML include a negative perception of 
the IRF expansion approval process, distrust in institutional authority, a negative 
perception of potential IRF risks, distrust in the justification for bioterrorism research, a 
negative perception of the equity of IRF expansion, and a perceived lack of economic 
benefits from IRF expansion.
Other studies have found that very similar factors including distrust, risk 
perception, equity, and a perceived lack of economic benefits characterize opposition to 
other types of high risk facilities (Murdock et al. 1999; Spies et al. 1998). Thus, this 
study reflects the prior literature that has examined opposition to other types of high risk 
hazardous facilities. However, participants’ negative perception of the IRF expansion 
approval process as a major theme characterizing their opposition stood out as a more 
prevalent factor than the community participation factor previously found in other studies 
(Murdoch et al. 1999; Spies et al. 1998; Wakefield and Elliot 2000). Additionally, unlike 
the previous literature, participants’ distrust in the justification for bioterrorism research 
was a unique theme that emerged in this study.
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Similar Findings to Previous Literature
Four themes characterizing participants’ opposition to the IRF expansion at RML 
are similar to the factors of distrust, risk perception, equity, and perceived lack of 
economic benefits found in the prior literature.
Distrust
Previous studies have found that distrust in high risk hazardous facility 
management and technology experts impacts residents’ opposition to such facilities 
(Albrecht, Amey and Amir 1996; Couch and Kroll-Smith 1994; Flynn et al. 1992; 
Jenkins-Smith and Kunreuther 2001; Sjoberg 2004; Wakefield and Elliot 2000). In this 
study, distrust was a theme found to characterize participants’ descriptions of their 
opposition to the IRF expansion at RML. The dimensions of distrust that characterized 
participants’ expression of opposition to the IRF expansion included distrust in laboratory 
scientists at RML, distrust in the federal government, and distrust in information about 
RML as sources of reliable information were often rumors and stories.
Like residents in previous communities studied, participants doubted the 
infallibility of RML scientists in insuring laboratory safety. As Mr. Hill noted, “Humans 
make mistakes all the time. And we are always going to. ” Thus, participants felt that 
human error by laboratory scientists was inevitable, and their distrust was magnified by 
RML claims of infallibility. Participants’ opposition was also characterized by distrust in 
the federal government. This dimension was reportedly contextualized within a broader 
distrust of the federal government. For example, Mr. Potter said, “You are right we don’t 
trust the government. We know what they [federal government] do. We can see it on TV 
and read about in the paper.’’ In addition, distrust of the federal government was fostered
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by participants’ negative perception of how the IRF approval process was handled by the 
NIH. This was evident when participants suggested that the government was “hiding 
things” and “going through the motions” during the IRF approval process.
One additional dimension of distrust found in this study has not been identified in 
the findings of previous literature. Participants expressed distrust in information about 
RML because sources of reliable information were often rumors and stories. Compared 
to other studies of high risk hazardous facilities, this is a unique dimension of distrust that 
is embedded within the RML’s long historical presence within the community. Other 
studies have not found this to be a dimension of distrust characterizing residents’ 
opposition to high risk hazardous facilities. I suggest this finding may be due to the 
increased bureaucracy, primarily in hiring more employees, and residents’ perceptions of 
decreased transparency at RML. Currently, over 250 people are employed at RML and 
the laboratory is not open to the public. Therefore, rumors and stories that circulate about 
RML exist as residents speculate about the unknown research that is conducted by 
unfamiliar scientists taking place in their community.
Risk Perception
In addition to distrust, previous studies have also found that a negative risk 
perception affects residents’ opposition to high risk hazardous facilities (Bourke 1994; 
Flynn et al. 1992; Jenkins-Smith and Kunreuther 2001; Krannich and Albrecht 1995;
Spies et al. 1998). This study also found that a negative risk perception characterized 
participants’ opposition to the IRF expansion at RML. This theme was characterized by 
two dimensions, including dread of potential accidents and a fear of the unknown.
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Participants’ risk perceptions were strongly characterized by their dread of a 
potentially devastating biological agent release from the laboratory. Similarly, other 
studies of community response to high risk hazardous facilities have found that residents 
dread potential accidents and the ensuing contamination to public health (Bassett, 
Jenkins-Smith and Silva 1996) and the environment (Albrecht el al. 1996; Baxter, Eyles 
and Elliott 1999; Krannich & Albrecht 1995). Participants described their dread of an 
accidental release of these deadly biological agents. In this study, dread of the IRF 
expansion at RML is apparent because the biological agents that can be studied in a BSL 
IV laboratory are extremely deadly. For example, Ms. Moore noted, “Any BSL four 
agent [release] would be devastating, absolutely devastating.”
Another dimension of negative risk perception found to characterize participants’ 
opposition was a fear of the unknown. This theme was closely related to participants’ 
dread of an accidental biological release since participants feared the unknown outcome 
of an accidental biological release. Similarly, risk perception studies have found that 
people perceive hazardous facilities as unknown risks (Slovic 1987). Participants’ fears 
of the unknown were characterized by uncertainty about what could happen in the event 
of a biological agent release from the BSL FV laboratory. In this study, fear of the 
unknown was a prevalent dimension of negative risk perception because biological 
agents found in a BSL IV laboratory are very high risk since these deadly diseases cannot 
yet be cured. Additionally, participants’ fears of the unknown were elevated when their 
safety questions about potential releases were not adequately answered in the IRF 
approval process. For instance, Ms. Moore noted, ‘They [RML and NIH] didn’t have an 
answer [to questions]. They had no idea.”
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Equity
Equity issues were another result from this study that reflects findings from 
previous studies of high risk hazardous facilities (Albrecht et. al 1996; Jenkins-Smith and 
Kunreuther 2001; Murdoch et al. 1999; Spies et al. 1998). Participants’ opposition was 
characterized by a perception that their community was intentionally selected because it 
is a rural locale. This finding reflects results from previous studies, but in this study, the 
theme of equity is less multidimensional. Equity factors that have been found to 
influence community opposition to high risk hazardous facilities include the beliefs that 
the community has been targeted because it is poor and ethnic as well as rural (Albrecht 
et. al 1996). However, this study did not find that equity issues of ethnicity or class were 
salient themes characterizing participants’ opposition to the ERF expansion at RML.
Rather, rurality emerged as the primary equity dimension characterizing 
participants’ opposition to the IRF expansion at RML. While many other high risk 
hazardous facilities are primarily located in rural areas, no other biolaboratories are yet 
located in rural areas so that RML is the first rural locale hosting a BSL IV laboratory. 
Participants’ descriptions of the equity question about siting a BSL IV laboratory in their 
community included the perception that Hamilton had been intentionally selected by the 
federal government because of its rural location. Participants’ perceptions of the inequity 
were magnified by the NIH internal memorandum that explained why their rural 
community had been identified to host the BSL IV laboratory. Rurality also emerged as 
the primary equity factor characterizing participants’ opposition in part because of their
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distrust of the federal government. As Ms. Brooks noted, “People back East [in the 
United States] don’t even think that Montana is in the same country. In a small town of 
Montana, we are so expendable.”
Perceived Lack o f  Economic Benefits
Previous studies have found that residents’ perceived lack of economic benefits 
from high risk hazardous facilities impacts their opposition (Bourke 1994; Krannich and 
Albrecht 1995; Murdock et al. 1999; Spies et al. 1998). Similarly, this study also found 
that some participants characterized their opposition in terms of a perceived lack of 
economic benefits in noting that any possible potential economic benefits of the IRF 
would be offset by the perceived costs associated with the IRF expansion. Perceived 
costs o f the IRF expansion primarily included the accidental release of a BSL FV 
biological agent. As Mr. Potter noted, “But when something bad happens, it’s like way 
bad . . . but if it does go wrong, what is the price we have to pay for that? It could very 
steep.” In this study, participants perceived the costs associated with the IRF expansion 
at RML as outweighing any potential economic benefits.
In sum, four of the themes from this study reflect the results of prior literature 
examining opposition to other types of high risk hazardous facilities. Additionally, two 
themes from this study are unique and do not reflect findings from the prior literature of 
community response to high risk hazardous facilities.
Unique Findings
Two unique themes were found to characterize participants’ opposition to the 
biolaboratory expansion. These themes included a negative perception of the IRF 
expansion approval process and distrust in the justification for bioterrorism research.
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Participants’ perceptions of the approval process stood out as a more prevalent theme 
than related factors like community participation that have been previously found in other 
studies examining community response to high risk hazardous facilities (Murdoch et 
al.l999; Spies et al. 1998; Wakefield and Elliot 2000). In contrast to the previous 
literature, participants’ distrust in the justification for bioterrorism research was a unique 
theme that emerged in this study.
Negative Perception o f  the IRF Approval Process
Negative perception of the IRF approval process was a stronger theme in this 
study than the related factor of attitudes toward community participation identified in the 
previous literature. Previous studies have found that residents have been generally 
satisfied with the public process of approving high risk hazardous facilities (Murdoch et 
al. 1999; Spies et al. 1998; Wakefield and Elliott 2000). However, participants in this 
study reflected strong dissatisfaction with the IRF expansion public participation process. 
Negative perception of the public process was the most prevalent theme found to 
characterize participants’ descriptions of their opposition to the IRF expansion at RML. 
Negative perception of the public process was found to be a multidimensional theme, 
which included their perception of a predetermined outcome, their concern with 
unaddressed safety issues, their experience with unanswered questions, and a sense of 
feeling powerless.
I suggest that this theme, to a certain extent, may be due to local community 
culture. In this remote corner of Montana, local citizens have a strong history of 
grassroots protest and organizing. In the case of the proposed IRF expansion, Bitterroot 
Valley residents have historically protested decisions regarding the establishment and
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operation o f  RM L. F o r exam ple, in the early 1900s, local ranchers destroyed arsenic vats 
designed by  entom ologists to eradicate ticks from  the valley’s cattle population to curb 
the spread o f  spotted fever. Later, in 1927, over 400 residents in the Bitterroot Valley 
opposed the initial construction o f RM L in Ham ilton. In addition to RM L centered 
protests, residents o f the B itterroot Valley have more recently engaged in a series of 
controversies including the state’s expansion of M ontana State H ighway 93, Bitterroot 
National Forest land m anagem ent policies, county growth m anagem ent policies, and 
grizzly bear réintroduction by the U.S. Fish and W ildlife Service.
As frequent protestors, local citizens in the Bitterroot Valley, especially 
environm ental groups, are fam iliar with national environm ental laws, especially the 
National Environm ental Policy Act (NEPA). Environm ental groups played a key 
leadership role in the overall opposition m ovem ent against the IRF expansion at RML. 
Individuals from  these groups were familiar and experienced with the NEPA process and 
were able to assist, and to some extent, lead the opposition m ovement. Although 
participants in this study had not previously been involved with a biolaboratory 
expansion approval process, they were fam iliar with the NEPA process.
In addition to participants’ fam iliarity with the NEPA process, their negative 
perceptions o f the approval process were impacted by their belief that NIH did not 
adequately follow  the NEPA process. For exam ple, Mr. Potter said, “NIH apparently had 
never done an EIS before because it really is one o f the lamest EIS imaginable. They did 
som e things that are ju st blatantly illegal.” Thus, participants’ belief that the NEPA 
process w as not adequately follow ed by NIH was a key element in shaping their distrust.
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D istrust in the Justification fo r  Bioterrorism  Research
In addition to the stronger prevalence o f  a negative perception o f the IRF public 
process, participants’ d istrust in the justification for bioterrorism  research was a unique 
them e that em erged in this study. This them e had not been identified in previous studies 
as a factor characterizing com m unity response to a high risk hazardous facility. Distrust 
in the justification for bioterrorism  research emerged as a multidimensional theme 
characterizing participant’s opposition to the IRF expansion. The dimensions o f  the 
them e included participants questioning both the m otivation behind and also the need for 
bioterrorism  research. Participants questioned the m otivation for bioterrorism research 
when they explained that a fear o f bioterrorism  in general, rather than an actual terrorist 
threat was the m ajor reason for the IRF expansion. However, participants’ responses 
varied regarding the need for bioterrorism  research. Some participants supported 
bioterrorism  research w hile others did not.
D istrust in the justification for bioterrorism  research is a unique theme in this 
study of a com m unity response to a biolaboratory because this type of facility is equipped 
with the unique technology to pursue bioterrorism  research. Thus, since other high risk 
hazardous facilities do not conduct bioterrorism  research, it has not been found to 
characterize opposition to other high risk hazardous facilities. I suggest that this theme, 
and the am biguity o f participants’ views o f bioterrorism, is a direct response to the 
terrorist attacks occurring on Septem ber 11, 2001 and the ensuing nation-wide fear o f 
terrorism . A lthough terrorism  is not entirely new, this type of terrorism, including
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com m ercial airplanes as w eapons and biological o r chem ical attacks, is particularly 
dreaded and am biguous. Thus, it appears that terrorism  has em erged as “a new species o f 
trouble” (Slovic 2002).
Participants in my study had to grapple with terrorism  as “a new species o f 
trouble” and the institutionalizing o f bioterrorism  research in their community. To some 
extent, their reaction to bioterrorism  research m ay have been m ixed because bioterrorism  
is a relatively new phenom enon. Participants who opposed bioterrorism  research also 
resisted the institutionalizing o f risk because these agents could be misused by the federal 
governm ent. M r. Potter noted, “I think we have some crazy people running this country 
and it w ould not be beyond them  to m isuse the research that is coming out of there 
[RM L].” Thus, these participants’ stance against bioterrorism  research was primarily 
shaped by their distrust in the federal governm ent and what federal officials could do 
with bioterrorism  agents or research.
Participants who supported bioterrorism  research expressed a perspective that 
reflected the N IM BY  syndrom e (Fitchen 1991; Portney 1991). They approved of 
bioterrorism  research, as long as it was not conducted in their community. As Mr.
A dam s noted, “A level four lab belongs in a place like down at the Nevada Test site. 
Som eplace like that where there is 80 m iles of buffer zone between where the public can 
get to and where the lab is.” M ost participants’ perspectives often reflected the NIM BY 
syndrom e since m ost participants did not want the BSL IV laboratory located in their 
com m unity. Som e participants rejected not only for their own community, but other 
potential locales that may be affected by biolaboratories. Thus, to some extent, they 
justified  their N IM BY  response in their expressed opposition to setting precedence for
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future com m unities’ encounters w ith proposed biolaboratories. Mr. Davis said, “If we 
d o n ’t hold them  [NIH] to a standard . . .  if they get away with it, what happens to NEPA? 
T his is for o ther peop le’s backyard.”
Fragm ented O pposition to the IR F Expansion
Participants’ descriptions o f their opposition to the ERF expansion at RM L were 
characterized by several them es; however, the extent to which each theme influenced 
each partic ipan t’s opposition varied. Thus, the descriptions o f opposition to the IRF 
expansion varied and w ere som ewhat fragmented.
T heir fragm ented descriptions may be partially explained by participants’ 
difficulty in “fram ing” their opposition (Benford and Snow 2000). Frames are “action- 
orientated sets o f beliefs and m eanings that inspire and legitimate the activities and 
cam paigns o f social m ovem ent organization” (Benford and Snow 2000:614). In this 
study, a variety o f fram es seemed to support participants’ opposition to the IRF 
expansion at RM L. Every participant’s opposition was characterized by a unique 
narrative discourse in expressing the most prevalent themes. Some of the participants did 
not want the expansion to occur at all, while others only wanted to ensure that the public 
process was adequately followed. Thus, the “m aster fram e”, or the general and primary 
focus o f the opposition, was not well defined by the movement (Benford and Snow 
2000).
A dditionally, the opposition groups varied in their position about the IRF 
expansion. Previously established local environm ental groups struggled to frame their 
opposition to the IRF expansion. M r. Green noted, “ [Organization name] is painted as a 
[environm ental issue], so any tim e you get out o f that core thing that brought them
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[organization m em bers] together they were split over i t . . .  They were kind o f split. They 
d id n ’t w ant to  be anti-lab.” Thus, to some extent, previously established local 
environm ental groups struggled to fram e their opposition because the IRF expansion at 
RM L was a new  issue that challenged the boundaries of their existing organization’s 
m ission and purpose. Thus, fram ing o f the issue by opposition groups was disjointed.
The fragm ented opposition may also be explained by the unfam iliarity o f the 
biolaboratory and bioterrorism  issues. Although RM L has been operating within the 
com m unity for over 80 years, a biolaboratory expansion approval process has not 
recently occurred. R esidents, to some extent, were unfam iliar with biolaboratories and 
the technology involved w ith BSL IV laboratories. Opposition groups that became 
involved with this issue were not fam iliar with other biolaboratory expansions. 
Additionally, the threat o f bioterrorism  and the institutionalizing o f bioterrorism research 
is a relatively new phenom enon. Because of these unfam iliar issues, uncertainty about 
their significance and im pact locally in the B itterroot Valley created the fragmented 
opposition.
O pposition T ransform ation into Acceptance o f  the IRF Expansion
For com m unities affected by high risk hazardous facilities, it has been suggested 
that residents’ experience the “process o f  negotiation” (W ulfhorst 2000). During this 
process, residents m ove beyond opposing a high risk hazardous facility and begin to 
accept and fam iliarize them selves with the new facility. Following W ulfhorst (2000), I 
suggest that participants in this study experienced a transform ation from opposition to the 
IRF expansion to an unw illing acceptance of the BSL IV laboratory. Ms. Jackson 
com m ented, “ In the beginning it was an opposition . . .  I personally was too—totally
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opposed to it [IRF expansion]—and I did not want to see that happen here. As time went 
on, m y view s, m y attitudes—m aybe not my view s—changed. I ’m still opposed to it but 
m y attitudes tow ard the reality o f  it happening changed.”
This acceptance m ay be due to their negative perceptions o f the public process 
and that the IRF expansion at RM L was a predeterm ined outcome. Ms. Brooks noted, 
“W e fought as hard as we could. Then we just, some o f us just threw in the towel and 
w ent hom e.” A dditionally, participants may have begun to accept the IRF expansion 
because o f  R M L ’s long historical presence in the comm unity. Thus, they perceived only 
a slim  possibility that RM L w ould cease to exist in the community.
A lthough participants’ opposition to the IRF expansion at RM L was transform ed 
into an acceptance, it seem ed this acceptance was only a final resignation to the 
inevitability o f the outcom e. Thus, participants “settled” for safety concessions from 
NIH. M s. Peterson said, “W e honestly couldn’t go into m ediation saying ‘we don’t want 
the lab ever’ standpoint. There is nothing we could gain at that point.”
Participants’ transform ation from  an opposition into an acceptance of the IRF 
expansion was difficult. Mr. Hill com m ented, “As far as that part [outcome], it was kind 
o f disheartening. You know , to do all that work and see it ju st kind o f swept under the 
carpet.” Participants struggled to accept the futility of their resistance. For example, Ms. 
Jackson said, “As soon as the record o f decision was out, it was like okay. I had come to 
that reality. I knew it was going to happen. I was done. I am done, I am done. I have 
put in m y tim e and I’ve done everything I could possibly do.” Thus, although 
participants’ opposition transform ed into an acceptance of the IRF expansion, it was a 
troublesom e process.
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L im itations o f  the Study
T he first lim itation o f this study is that I only explored the perspectives o f those 
opposed to the IRF expansion at RM L. A lthough the perspectives o f those opposed to 
the opposition are im portant in understanding residents’ reactions to a biolaboratory 
expansion, these only represent a particular selection o f the wide variety o f possible 
perspectives. Hence, this exploration ignores the perspectives o f those who supported the 
IRF expansion at RML. An exploration o f the perspectives o f those supporting the IRF 
expansion w ould provide a more in-depth and broader understanding of a com m unity’s 
response to a biolaboratory expansion. Furtherm ore, an exploration o f other points of 
view could increase the understanding o f how and why people’s perspectives o f a 
biolaboratory expansion may vary.
A nother lim itation o f this study is the small num ber o f participants interviewed. 
Only 10 residents opposed to the biolaboratory expansion were interviewed in this study. 
This small num ber lim its my ability to generalize the findings of this study to represent 
all o f  those opposed to the biolaboratory expansion. Additionally, it limits my ability to 
generalize the findings o f this study to residents’ reactions to biolaboratories and other 
types o f high risk hazardous facilities in sim ilar communities. Furthermore, since my 
participants were selected through snowball sam pling, I do not know if my sample 
adequately represents all residents o f the com m unity that were opposed to the IRF 
expansion at RML.
In addition to a small num ber o f participants, another limitation of this study was 
that the data were collected after the IRF expansion approval process had been 
com pleted. D ata for this study w ere collected from  August to November, 2005. The
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decision to bu ild  the IRF expansion had already been announced in June, 2004 and the 
settlem ent betw een opposition groups and the N IH  had been reached in September, 2004. 
T hus, nearly one year had passed when I collected the data for this study. This may have 
influenced partic ipan ts’ m em ories and descriptions o f their opposition to the IRF 
expansion.
C onclusion
The purpose o f this study was to explore whether a biolaboratory is perceived as a 
high risk hazardous facility. The response o f participants in this study to the 
biolaboratory expansion reflects, to some degree, the com m unity response of residents to 
o ther proposed or existing high risk hazardous facilities. Like comm unity responses to 
other high risk hazardous facilities, this study found biolaboratories elicit distrust, 
negative risk perceptions, negative equity perceptions, and a perceived lack of economic 
benefits. H ow ever, as a different type o f high risk hazardous facility, this study also 
found a unique com m unity response to biolaboratories in participants strong negative 
perceptions o f  the public process and distrust in the justification for bioterrorism 
research. Thus, I conclude that based on the them es characterizing opposition to the IRF 
expansion at RML, that biolaboratories are perceived to be another type o f a high risk 
hazardous facility.
Erikson (1994) has suggested that society is plagued by a “new species of 
trouble” that is characterized by technological disasters that provoke dread and 
uncertainty. Are biolaboratories becom ing a “new species of trouble” ? Biolaboratories 
are institutions that com bat infectious diseases. As I discovered in this study, 
bioterrorism  research has been incorporated into the purpose of biolaboratories. This
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institutionalization o f b ioterrorism  reportedly will decrease risks associated with possible 
bioterrorism  attacks. H ow ever, as this study also revealed, the institutionalization of 
bioterrorism  research is not a  risk-free endeavor. New risks, such as a possible terrorist 
attacks on a biolaboratory, release o f a deadly biological agent into a host community, or 
the potential for bioterrorism  research to create biological weapons, may emerge from  the 
institutionalization o f bioterrorism  research. Thus, this study has found that 
biolaboratories, as an unexplored type o f high risk hazardous facility, indeed may be 
considered a “new species o f trouble.”
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A ppendix A. BSL description (NIAID 2004b).
BSL-1 labs are used to study agents not known to consistently cause disease in 
healthy adults. They follow  basic safety procedures and require no special equipm ent or 
design features.
B SL-2 labs are used to study m oderate-risk agents that pose a danger if 
accidentally  inhaled, sw allow ed or exposed to the skin. Safety m easures include the use 
o f  gloves and eyew ear as well as hand washing sinks and waste decontamination 
facilities.
BSL-3 labs are used to study agents that can be transm itted through the air and 
cause potentially  lethal infection. Researchers perform lab m anipulations in a gas-tight 
enclosure. O ther safety features include clothing decontam ination, sealed windows, and 
specialized ventilation system s.
BSL-4 labs are used to study agents that pose a high risk of life-threatening 
disease for which no vaccine or therapy is available. Lab personnel are required to wear 
full-body, air-supplied suits and to shower when exiting the facility. The labs incorporate 
all BSL 3 features and occupy safe, isolated zones within a larger building.
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A ppendix B . B itterroot V alley Population and spotted fever cases (Figures
docum ented by Philip 2000).
Y ear Population Spotted fever cases
1870 370 1
1880 1222 16
1890 3,950 83
1900 7,822 141
1910 11,666 86
1920 10,207 37
1930 11,647 39
1940 13,040 8
1950 12,721 1
1960 12,341 4
1970 14,409 11
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A ppendix C. Interview  Guide.
1. W hen you first heard about the RM L expansion, how did you react to the news? 
Probe: Can you describe how/when you heard about the proposal?
2. W hat w as your biggest concern with the expansion project?
Probe: W hat were some other concerns you had?
3. W hat did you do to express your concerns?
Probe: D id you jo in  an opposition group? How and when did you get involved? 
Probe: How w ould you describe your involvem ent with this group?
Probe: W hat was the group’s viewpoint o f  the RM L upgrade?
4. C an you describe your view point o f the RM L expansion project?
Probe: Did you opinion change at all over tim e? In what ways?
Probe: How was upgrade approval process handled by RM L?
5. Before this lab expansion issue began, how did you feel about the lab?
Probe: Do you rem em ber the last upgrade to a BL 3?
Probe: Did the events o f Septem ber 11 im pact your personal response to the lab 
expansion? In what ways?
6. H ow has the expansion approval process impacted the community?
7. Is there anything else that is important you would like to mention?
I am  trying to represent all those whom  I should in this study. Is there anyone you 
m ight suggest I talk to?
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